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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The big picture context 
 
Some stark facts face the international community. To have a reasonable probability of keeping 
average global warming below 2oC we need what the IEA in its new Energy Technology 
Perspectives 2008 study refers to as “a new energy revolution”.  
 
This reaffirms information provided in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report. These reports, 
combined with others such as the UNFCCC report in 2007 on Investment and Financial Flows 
and the McKinsey cost curves, provide a clear and consistent picture: 
• We already have commercially available all of the technologies and systems that, 
deployed at scale and globally, could lead to the needed peaking of global emissions in 
the next one to two decades.  
• Additionally there are some key technologies, in particular carbon capture and storage, 
that in the next one to two decades need to be commercially proven at scale, so that in the 
following decades the world can transform its energy systems to enable global greenhouse 
gas emissions to be reduced at least in half by 2050, and more thereafter.  
• The additional needed investment and financial flows in low carbon technologies and 
systems (e.g. in 2030 to reduce global emissions to today’s levels by then) are large by 
today’s measure, but only a tiny fraction of total global investment (under 2% in 2030).  
• Much of the location of the needed deployment of low carbon technologies and systems in 
the next one to two decades, and in the longer term, is in developing countries. This is 
because of the rapid expansion of energy systems infrastructure due to: 
o population and economic growth;  
o the rural-to-urban population shift;  
o the fact that developing countries are increasingly manufacturing the energy 
intensive goods consumed by the industrialised world; 
o and, critically, the need for improved energy services to alleviate poverty.  
 
In the light of this challenge, the international community is moving towards the next (post-2012) 
‘global deal’ on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions – and adapting to the effects of climate 
change made inevitable by emissions that have already occurred and those that will even as we 
mitigate emissions. The UNFCCC ‘Copenhagen Agreement’ sought by the end of 2009 will be 
the centrepiece of any such global deal. 
 
A particularly challenging aspect of any such agreement and deal is the role that developing 
countries will play in the global mitigation effort. Any agreement that includes emission reductions 
in defined sectors in developing countries must be complemented with appropriate financing 
mechanisms. Traditional sources of funding, e.g. pledged additional funds by industrialised countries 
administered by the GEF, are inadequate for this purpose. In particular they lack the scale necessary 
by at least an order of magnitude.  
 
New sector based policy instruments for developing countries  
 
There are a number of possible forms of sectoral agreements that together can help provide the 
comprehensive coverage of sectors and sources where abatement potential exists in developing 
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countries – assuming adequate financing support is forthcoming. Two, in particular, that can be 
seen as mutually supportive, are Sustainable Development Policies and Measures (SD-PAMs) 
and Sector No-Lose Targets (SNLTs), the focus of this paper. SNLTs would be targets taken on 
voluntarily by some developing countries for some sectors. The ‘no lose’ feature means that 
developing countries would not face compliance penalties if they did not meet their SNLTs. 
 
A key distinguishing feature (which also speaks to the complementary nature of these two policy 
instruments) is that the support for SD-PAMs would not come from carbon finance whereas 
SNLTs is specifically conceived as a scaled-up carbon finance mechanism. Such mechanisms 
exist in the context of ‘cap and trade’ emissions trading schemes for industrialised countries, 
complemented by schemes that allow credits to be generated through emissions reduction and sink 
enhancement activities in developing countries. SNLTs do this at the sector level. 
 
Scaling up of the magnitude required will require very purposeful programs that aggregate on-the-
ground activities in ways never previously achieved. A policy tool such as SNLTs not only needs to 
be seen as just one ‘compliance carbon’ policy tool among a number of others, but the role and 
applicability of carbon financing needs to be seen in a broader strategic sense – i.e. as just one of 
many elements. By taking a strategic program approach to low carbon investments, it can be 
expected that all elements, and all carbon finance policy tools, can operate at a scale thus far not 
achieved. 
 
The feature that particularly distinguishes SNLTs from CDM-type policy instruments is that once 
SNLTs are agreed as part of a quantitative multilateral agreement the concept of additionality no 
longer applies – nor any of the CDM institutional constraints that go along with this. This is because 
in the quantitative elements of the post-2012 agreement the fixed and binding targets of 
industrialised countries would be set in the light of the scale of credits that would be expected to be 
generated by SNLTs from developing countries – as indeed they are in the light of each other’s 
targets. So SNLTs (and the credits that may stem from them) are explicitly accepted and factored 
into the elements of the overall agreement that set a quantitative emissions outcome. 
 
It can be expected that developing countries may be attracted to consider SNLTs in sectors for which 
they seek significantly scaled up private sector investment according to their sustainable 
development priorities, and where current carbon market policy tools, such as the various forms of 
CDM, are not considered adequate to the task.  
 
But, SNLTs are unlikely to be feasible for all key sectors, and even for those sectors where they may 
be feasible, this may not be true in all developing countries. Like all credit based mechanisms, it is 
necessary with SNLTs to establish (and have agreed) a baseline, and then measure (and report and 
verify) performance against this. Given that the use of this tool is in developing countries, the 
performance metric is typically framed in intensity terms to ensure that it does not operate as a cap 
on development. Having intensity baselines means the need for both the parameters in the 
numerator and denominator to be measurable – and measured, reported and verified. In practice, 
this limits the applicability of SNLTs in the near term. 
Some likely candidates of sectors (and baseline metrics) are: 
• electricity generation: tonnes CO2e per MWh generated. It might also be feasible to do a 
separate sector baseline for resultant emissions associated with electricity losses in 
transmission and distribution systems.  
• cement or aluminium or steel production: tonnes CO2e per tonne produced. Other similar 
type industrial commodities may also be feasible, e.g. bricks, pulp and paper, some 
chemicals including refined oil products, some mining and mineral processing etc. 
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• ‘upstream’ emissions of oil and gas production (e.g. gas venting and flaring): tonnes CO2e 
per barrel of oil delivered to refineries or export facilities, or volume of gas delivered. 
 
While the potential for SNLTs therefore has these limits, it must be noted that these particular sectors 
(especially electricity generation) account for a very significant portion of emissions and emissions 
growth in developing countries. Importantly, they represent sectors where trillions of dollars of new 
capital investment in long lived (and usually emissions intensive) capital ‘plant’ is expected in the 
next two decades. Avoiding such lock-in of emissions is a critical issue in the global mitigation 
challenge. 
 
The demand-supply issue 
 
To be successful as means to scale up investments in low carbon technologies and practices in 
developing countries, credit-based mechanisms such as SNLTs rely on there being a demand for 
credits. The carbon market will not function if there is not – carbon will have no value. In short, 
significant reduction targets of all industrialised countries are needed – which is consistent with the 
science-based calls for reductions of -25 to -40% by 2020. And on the supply side, the CDM process 
needs to be cautious about the automatic renewal of projects that have already produced large 
volumes of credits. Otherwise, credits from existing CDM projects, and those currently in the CDM 
pipeline, could already provide a very significant portion of the demand expected from industrialised 
countries’ targets. 
 
This demand-supply balance issue is already leading to a growing awareness that mechanisms that 
may ‘flood’ the market with large numbers of ‘low cost’ compliance credits from developing countries 
may not be good for the overall health of the carbon market, or global mitigation efforts. This 
suggests that there will continue to be close attention to baselines, whether these are part of CDM-
based mechanisms or of the form of SNLTs. 
 
Preparing for and negotiating SNLTs 
 
In the immediate term, the greatest challenge to have SNLTs become a viable part of the post-
2012 agreement is having developing countries become aware of and interested in this potential 
scaling up mechanism, and then undertake the necessary in-country work to prepare and 
present proposals for SNLTs. This is a process that is likely to require significant institutional 
capacity building and technical assistance.1 This is true within interested developing countries and 
for the multilateral negotiation process itself.  
 
A key issue is how the post-2012 negotiations are going to cope with the need for objective and 
accurate data and analysis on countries’ national circumstances and proposals that is transparent 
and accessible. This issue applies equally to industrialised countries’ proposals for targets as it does 
to any proposals by developing countries for SNLTs. A neutral technical expert body is needed, 
drawing on expertise from a range of institutions. 
 
A key issue that needs to be dealt with is how to deal with the situation where proposals for SNLTs 
for some key sectors in some key developing countries are not sufficiently developed at the time it is 
expected that industrialised countries’ targets should be agreed. The best way to address this ‘timing 
mismatch’ is to accelerate capacity building efforts targeted to key sectors (e.g. electricity generation) 
in key countries. Also, the World Bank’s Carbon Partnership Facility may be a possible learn-by-
doing ‘vehicle’ for some key sectors and some countries. But the reality will still likely exist that a 
                                                 
1 A sectoral proposals template has been developed by Ecofys/GtripleC (so far with promise, in particular, in the 
electricity generation and cement sectors, with development of other sectors underway). 
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To achieve sectoral emission reductions and ‘beat their targets’, national governments could 
implement domestic policies and measures with direct links for entities to the international 
carbon market, e.g. schemes that allocate credits to emission reduction actions by entities in the 
relevant sector; or establishing internal emissions trading schemes like the EU ETS; 
 
Governments could also implement new and additional domestic policies, or enhance 
enforcement of existing measures, that do not rely on carbon finance and emissions trading. 
Carbon taxes, enhanced law enforcement, intensity or efficiency standards, and subsidies 
(either adding or removing subsidies as the case may be for a particular sector) are examples of 
these types of policies and measures. Governments can then sell the received credits directly on 
international carbon markets. 
 
A critical issue for developing countries with SNLTs is how can the interest of project developers 
and carbon financiers, whose activities thus far under the CDM have focused at the project level, 
be maintained when crediting occurs at a sector level and, in the first instance, is directed to 
governments. In the circumstance where private sector carbon market players may see it as 
difficult to work via domestic governments, it may be possible to nest more traditional project 




SNLTs are not a scaling up ‘silver bullet’. But they have some characteristics which suggest that 
for some sectors in some key developing countries they may be the best new carbon finance 
mechanisms identified thus far. Moreover, in conjunction with SD-PAMs, they may be what is 
needed to strike the appropriate political balance (regarding mitigation) between industrialised 
and developing countries in the post-2012 agreement.  
 
However, to realise this potential a very large effort is needed in a very short time. This will 
require proactive leadership by world leaders – in industrialised and developing countries, and in 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Additionality 
A project is additional if the resulting emission reductions ‘would not have happened in absence 
of the project’, i.e. are reduced the baseline emissions. 
 
Allocation 
Process or methodology to set the total cap for an emissions trading system and the distribution 
to individual participants. Can in the context of the EU ETS also refer to the amount of 
allowances received by an individual participant. 
 
Allowance 
Amount of emissions that a country may be emitted in a certain period. Can refer to allowances 
at the country level, i.e. the amount an Annex I Party is allowed to emit in the commitment period 
(see also assigned amount, credits, cap, target) or to allowances at an installation (company) 
level, i.e. the amount an EU ETS participant is allowed to emit in a year. 
 
Annex I  
For the purpose of differentiating commitments, the Convention contains an Annex, that lists the 
countries that are considered developed countries (OECD members and countries in Eastern 
Europe and the (former) Soviet Union), the so-called ‘Annex I countries’. For an overview of 
Annex I countries see Annex B of this guide. 
 
Annex I countries 
For the counties listed in Annex I, stronger commitments were established, including the 
implementation of policies and measures aiming to return greenhouse gas emissions levels to 
1990 levels by the year 2000 (in the Convention) and the reduction of emissions in 2008 to 2012 
about 5% below 1990 levels (for Annex I countries as a whole). All countries that are not listed in 
Annex I are referred to as Non-Annex I countries. 
 
Assigned amount  
For all Annex I countries, the emission reduction target is translated into an initial emission 
allowance, the assigned amount. It is calculated as the base year emissions times five times the 
reduction target, e.g. 0.95 for a 5% reduction (see Error! Reference source not found. and 




The baseline of a JI/CDM project activity is the scenario that reasonably represents the 
anthropogenic emissions by sources of greenhouse gases that would occur in the absence of 
the project activity.  
 
Cap 
Total amount of allowed emissions. Can refer to the country level Kyoto target, i.e. the amount of 
emissions that a country may emit in the commitment period (see also assigned amount, credits, 
allowance, target).More often it refers to the total amount of emissions allowed in an EU Member 
State under the EU ETS cap, i.e. the total number of EU allowances available in a country 
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Carbon market 
Combined market for trading CO2 or GHG-based commodities, such as allowances (EUAs, 
AAUs) and credits (CERs, ERUs, VERs) by direct participants (countries and companies) or 
market intermediairies. Can include the Kyoto-compliant market as well as the voluntary market. 
 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
Annex I counties invest in projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions by sources, or 
enhance removals by sinks, in non-Annex I countries. The Investor country can use the resulting 
"certified emission reductions” (CERs) against its own emission target. The project has to 
contribute to sustainable development in the Host country. 
 
Commitment period 
The period in which emissions of Annex I countries have to be reduced. The first commitment 
period is from 2008 to 2012. Subsequent commitment periods have to be defined. 
 
Convention  
Shorthand for United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)  
 
Crediting period 
Time interval for which a JI or CDM project generates emission reductions 
 
Credits 
Amount of emissions that are reduced through a project. For the Kyoto-compliant market 
measured in ERUs, CERs and RMUs (see also assigned amount, cap, allowance, target).For 
the voluntary carbon market measured in VERs or other types of credits.Sometimes also used to 
refer to the whole set of emission (reduction) units, i.e. also icluding AAUs and EUAs.  
 
Determination 
The process in which JI are evaluated, consisting of two steps: Determination whether a project 
meets the requirements on the basis of the project design document before the implementation 
of the project, and ensuring reductions meet the requirements after the implementation of the 
project, by an accredited independent entity. This is equivalent to validation and verification for 
CDM. 
 
Emissions Trading (ET) 
General term for systems in which emissions targets can be met (partly or wholy) by purchasing 
emission reduction credits or emission allowances from other parties. Often distinguishes beteen 
International Emissions Trading (IET) and national/regional systems, such as the EU Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS)  
 
Host country 
The country where the JI or CDM project is physically based. For JI this must be an Annex I 
country. For CDM it must be a Non-Annex I country. 
 
Installation 
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Joint implementation (JI) 
Annex I countries implement projects that reduce greenhouse gas emissions by sources, or 
enhance removals by sinks, in other Annex I countries. The Investor country can use the 
resulting "emission reduction units" (ERUs) against its own emission target.   
 
JI Supervisory Committee (JISC)  
See Article 6 Supervisory Committee 
 
Kyoto Protocol (KP) 
International treaty on climate change, developed as an annex to the UNFCCC. The protocol 
enters into force once it is ratified by at least 55 parties to the Convention and by those parties, 
whose emissions account for at least 55% of Annex I emissions in 1990. From that moment 
Annex I countries that have ratified the Protocol, will be legally bound to the targets and other 
obligations specified in the Protocol. 
 
Leakage 
The net change of emissions which occurs outside the project boundary, and which is 
measurable and attributable to the project. 
 
Monitoring 
Estimation or measurement of the actual emissions within the project or installation boundary. 
 
Monitoring plan 
Plan that describes the collection and archiving of all relevant data necessary for assessing the 
level of greenhouse gas emissions, either from a JI/CDM project (all emissions during the 
crediting period) or from an EU ETS installation (in a yrear). 
 
National Communication (NC) 
Regular report all parties to the Convention must submit to the UNFCCC, describing sources 
and sinks of emissions, projections, policies and measures, vulnerability, etc. If this reporting 
requirement (and others) are not met, a country is not eligible to use the Kyoto Mechanisms.  
 
Operator 
Participating entity in the EU ETS, responsible (legal) person operating the installation covered 
by the EU ETS. Responsible for permit application and compliance. 
 
Phase 
Trading period under the EU ETS, consisting (after a 3-yr pilot phase – Phase I) of 5 years, for 
which allocation needs to be decided before the start of the Phase and in which allowances can 
be banked and borrowed. 
 
Phase III 
Trading period of the EU ETS to start in 2013. Rule for the system (including length of trading 
phases) may have changed by then (see phase). 
 
Protocol 
Shorthand for the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Validation 
Independent evaluation of the CDM project against the requirements of the CDM by a 
designated operational entity. Note that in the past, ‘validation’ was also used for the 
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independent evaluation of both JI and CDM projects, while in the Marrakech Accords it is 
reserved for CDM projects only. For JI, the Marrakech Accords use the term ‘determination’. 
 
Verification 
For CDM, the independent review and ex-post determination that the emission reductions have 
occurred as a result of the CDM project by a designated operational entity. Note that in the past, 
‘verification’ was also used for the independent review of emission reductions from both JI and 
CDM projects, while in the Marrakech Accords it is reserved for CDM projects only. For JI, the 
Marrakech Accords use the term ‘determination’. 
For the EU ETS, verification refers to the independent determination that the annual emissions 
of an installation have been reported correctly. 
 
Voluntary carbon market 
Part of the carbon market that deals with voluntary credits (and the use of compliance credits or 




- 13 - 




The international climate change community is urgently looking for means to ‘scale up’ 
investments in clean technology and systems worldwide, especially in developing countries. The 
need for this to happen is signalled by the recent fourth assessment of the IPCC, in particular by 
Working Group III which noted: 
With current climate change mitigation policies and related sustainable development practices, 
global GHG emissions will continue to grow over the next few decades: CO2 emissions between 
2000 and 2030 from energy use are projected to grow 45 to 110% over that period.  
Two thirds to three quarters of this increase in CO2 emissions is projected to come from non-
Annex I regions, with their average per capita energy CO2 emissions being projected to remain 
substantially lower than those in Annex I regions in 2030. 
 
Currently, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the only contribution by developing 
countries that is formally acknowledged under the international climate change regime. The 
need for something more than the current CDM is well documented, in particular something that 
addresses the scale issue by going beyond a project by project approach.  
 
The declaration of leaders at the 2007 G8 Summit held at Heiligendamm, Germany contained 
the statement (bolding added):  
We stress that further action should be based on the UNFCCC principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities......   
Action of emerging economies could take several forms, such as sustainable development 
policies and measures, an improved and strengthened clean development mechanism, the 
setting up of plans for the sectors that generate the most pollution so as to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions compared with a business as usual scenario.   
 
At a policy level, a “sectoral approach” is increasingly being talked about as a possible ‘scaling 
up’ modality2. In the UNFCCC policy community, a sectoral approach is also seen as a means to 
further engage developing countries in climate change action in ways acceptable to them and to 
industrialised countries expected to take on much deeper emission reduction commitments. 
 
But the details of what this means in practice, indeed including what is even meant by “sectoral 
approach”, has received limited in-depth attention and investigation thus far.  
 
1.1.1  Different forms of ‘sectoral approaches’ 
 
To help locate the discussion in this paper, it is useful to see where it fits in the broader typology 
of ‘sectoral approaches’. Recent work by the IEA on sectoral approaches culminated in a 
workshop on 14-15 May 2008.3  The IEA identified what they see as four different models of 
sectoral approach.  
 
                                                 
2 e.g. Bosi and Ellis (2005), Ellis and Baron (2005), Sterk and Wittneben (2005), Baron and Ellis (2006), Höhne et al 
(2006), Schmidt et al. (2006), Ward (2006), Bodansky (2007), Cosby et al. (2007) 
3 See http://www.iea.org/Textbase/work/workshopdetail.asp?WS_ID=380 for presentations and reports. 
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The type (and some summary characteristics and issues) of these four models are: 
1. No-lose sectoral targets and crediting mechanism 
• Developing countries adopt non-binding quantitative sectoral goals 
• Excess emission reductions are eligible as credits to be sold to industrialised countries 
to help them meet their fixed and binding targets 
2. SDPAMs or policy-based instruments 
• Sector-specific policies and measures in developing countries that have sustainable 
development as primary objective (SD-PAMs) 
• Provision of funding for SD-PAMs that, with MRV, reduce emissions beyond BAU 
• Binding or non-binding 
3. Transnational sectoral agreements 
• Transational agreement for a given industry 
• Substance of agreement: 
– Quantitative and/or qualitative goals (hier evtl. Auch Punkte statt Striche wählen (ist kein Pfeil) 
– Concerted R&D effort 
• Nature of agreement: 
– Voluntary industry agreement? 
– Voluntary industry-govt agreement? 
– Legally binding or non-binding govt-govt agreement? 
4. Sectoral approach to technology cooperation.  
• Identify sectors where significant mitigation could be achieved through enhanced 
international cooperation 
• Develop specific task forces / work programmes for unique needs of each sector 
• Collaborative activities: 
• Technology transfer, but also technology needs assessments, audits, data 
collection, staff training, capacity building for implementation of technology, R&D 
efforts  
• Funded through existing UN funds (SCCF, GEF), a new UN tech fund, a separate 
fund? 
• Lessons from APP? 
 
1.2 OBJECTIVE AND CONTENT OF THIS PAPER 
 
The objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive and robust analysis of the first of these 
models, i.e. taking an in-country sectoral targets and crediting approach to climate change 
action in developing countries4. This approach is intended to sit squarely within a negotiated, 
                                                 
4 Annex I countries might also consider sectoral dimensions in achieving national targets. However, in those 
countries, sectoral approaches should be considered only as policies and measures that help meet national targets, 
whereas for developing countries they could be a form of commitment in itself. 
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multilateral, quantitative model for a post-2012 climate regime. To be precise, we use the term 
sector no-lose targets (SNLTs) to describe the particular policy ‘tool’ that is the topic of this 
paper.  
 
To clearly distinguish this SNLTs concept from the other sectoral proposals in the literature, it is 
helpful to identify some of its key components, which consistently will be the basis of the 
discussion in this paper: 
• It is implemented domestically in developing countries, not through agreement among 
transnational companies; 
• ‘No-lose’ means the exceeding of a specified crediting baseline entitles a country to 
trade surplus emission reductions, but there is no penalty for not achieving that baseline; 
• By the same token, SNLTs would be implemented voluntarily by developing countries, 
as there is no penalty for non-compliance to enforce, or even facilitate; 
• SNLTs should be seen as a specific policy tool within an overall program approach to 
low carbon investment in developing countries; 
• SNLTs are distinct from CDM, in its current form, as well as programmatic and policy 
CDM, and sectoral CDM. In particular, SNLTs are negotiated at the same time as 
industrialised country targets – i.e. are part of the negotiation where overall quantitative 
outcomes are agreed. So additionality is not a core issue at the sector level. 
 
To be clear however, it is not the position of this paper that SNLTs are somehow the best of the 
sectoral models as they may apply to developing countries, or that they are even applicable in 
all sectors or in all developing countries. Rather, the view is that this may be a very valuable 
policy instrument in some sectors in some developing countries – among, and potentially 
alongside, other policy instruments that may be sectoral in nature. 
 
This paper, then, is intended to objectively assess how this policy tool can work in practice. 
Moreover, beyond just the possible end-point of the use of this policy tool for some sectors in 
some developing countries in a post-2012 framework, it explores potential transition steps that 
can be taken now to work towards this, e.g. programmatic CDM or other similar policy 
instruments. In particular, how might proposed new carbon fund facilities such as the World 
Bank’s new “Carbon Partnership Facility” and other private sector funds help provide ‘financing 
pull’ to such ideas, and support low carbon growth in developing countries, even before 2012 – 
e.g. as the original Prototype Carbon Fund did prior to the completion and agreement of the 
rules for the CDM. 
 
This paper carries over an important conceptual distinction, developed in Ward, Garibaldi et al 
(2008), that is drawn between ‘compliance carbon’5 policy tools such as SNLTs (or ‘classic’ 
project CDM or programmatic CDM) and an overall strategic program approach to low carbon 
investment in developing countries (see section 2.2). Such an approach may use these tools 
along with a broad array of others in the policies and measures ‘toolkit’, e.g. sustainable 
development policies and measures (SD-PAMs) also mentioned in the Heiligendamm 
declaration. 
 
                                                 
5 The term compliance carbon can be used to distinguish between (1) emission units and credits developed within 
some form of regulatory (or compliance) emissions management program (i.e. ‘cap and trade plus offsets’ schemes), 
and (2) offset credits generated within the voluntary carbon market. 
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Note that, while this paper focuses specifically on SNLTs, section 4 explores linkages with SD-
PAMs, and in doing so describes the SD-PAMS model in quite some detail. 
 
This paper is organised as follows: 
• Section 2 sets out the broad concepts and context that help frame the key issues that 
are covered in this paper. In particular, as noted above, it locates the discussion on 
SNLTs under an overarching strategic program approach to scaled up low carbon 
investment in developing countries. It also distinguishes the key attributes of SNLTs from 
other compliance carbon policy tools involving developing countries, including the current 
classic CDM and programmatic CDM, and future notions such as policy CDM and 
sectoral CDM. Having made clear what are the defining characteristics (and constraints) 
of SNLTs, this section then introduces what are seen as the critical issues and questions 
about this policy tool that are then taken up in following sections of the paper. 
• Section 3 focuses on immediate term issues relevant to getting international agreement 
to this new expanded form of compliance carbon mechanism. Picking up from the 
constraints identified in section 2, it describes key tasks that must be taken up to facilitate 
the future successful negotiation of such an approach in a post-2012 multilateral 
agreement, e.g. capacity building, data gathering, use of proposal templates, expert 
analysis and review, and securing the interest and engagement of private and public 
financing. This section also addresses the crucial (and in cases likely a determinative) 
issue of the data needs and monitoring, verification and reporting (MRV) systems that 
must be in place for this mechanism to be viable.  
• Section 4 focuses on the linkage between sectoral crediting and the concepts and 
details of sustainable development policies and measures (SD-PAMs). A part of this 
linkage question is what sources of funding separate from compliance carbon markets 
are available for the implementation of SD-PAMs – and how these can be 
complementary and non-conflicting. 
• Section 5, considers in greater detail the question of what type of domestic policies and 
measures can most effectively connect with the incentive of international carbon market 
financing applied at a sector level. A key issue is how can the interest of project 
developers and carbon financiers whose activities thus far under the CDM have focused 
at the project level – including, importantly, the issuance of carbon credits – be 
maintained when crediting occurs at a sector level and, in the first instance, is directed to 
governments. This section also explores key compliance and legal issues. It assesses 
the nature of the legal framework, including transaction structures and contracts, required 
both in an international setting (e.g. between external international carbon market 
financing and domestic governments and/or on-the-ground local project or program 
hosts) and in the domestic setting (e.g. between domestic governments and internally 
with on-the-ground local project or program hosts). 
• Section 6 pulls together some overall insights and conclusions. 
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2.    CONTEXT AND KEY CONCEPTS 
 
Key Messages Of This Section 
Scaling up needs new policy instruments and a strategic program approach 
• The scale of investments needed in low carbon technology are very large by comparison with 
today’s levels (as supported by today’s mechanisms to encourage low carbon investment) – 
100’s versus 10’s of billions of US$ annually. Developing countries’ expected rapid economic 
growth means that they will require a large share of these investment and financial flows (I&FF).  
• Investments in the energy supply sector are of particular significance, especially in power 
generation, industry and transport. By their nature these are long-lived capital investments – and 
the scale of these investments is very large. 
• There is reason for both optimism and pessimism. The UNFCCC I&FF study in 2007 notes that 
the around US$200 billion in 2030 estimated to be needed to get global emission back to today’s 
levels by 2030 is small in relation to estimated global GDP (0.3-0.5%) and global investment 
(1.1-1.7%) in 2030. But, on the other hand, changes of even this magnitude (small in percentage 
terms, but ‘large’ in absolute amounts) require a significant change from the business-as-usual 
behaviours of a large number of I&FF actors, public and private. Notably, global emission trends 
are still on a rising path. 
• Any post-Kyoto agreement that includes emission reductions in defined sectors in developing 
countries must be complemented with a financing mechanism. Traditional sources of funding, 
e.g. pledged additional funds by industrialised countries administered by the GEF, are 
inadequate for this purpose on three grounds: they fail to link funding with performance or 
success; they are typically slow and cumbersome; and they lack the scale necessary. Sectoral 
agreements involving developing countries are usually discussed in the context of ‘cap and 
trade’ emissions trading schemes for industrialised countries, complemented by offset schemes 
that allow compliance credits to be generated through emissions reduction and sink 
enhancement activities in developing countries. 
• Scaling up of the magnitude required will require very purposeful programs that aggregate on-
the-ground activities in ways never previously achieved. A policy tool such as SNLTs for 
developing countries not only needs to be seen as just one ‘compliance carbon’ policy tool 
among a number of others, but the role and applicability of carbon financing needs to be seen in 
a broader strategic sense – i.e. as just one of many elements. By taking a strategic program 
approach to low carbon investments, it can be expected that all elements, and all carbon finance 
policy tools, can operate at a scale thus far not achieved. 
• There is a continuum of possible ‘compliance carbon’ crediting ‘tools’ from the existing ‘regular’ 
project-based CDM and now programmatic CDM, to new CDM models such as sectoral or policy 
CDM, then to SNLTs. All of these may play a possible role in a ‘scaled-up’ future. The feature 
that particularly distinguishes SNLTs is that once these are agreed as part of a quantitative 
multilateral agreement the concept of additionality no longer applies – nor any of the institutional 
constraints that go along with this.  
Attributes and ‘issues’ of sector no-lose targets 
• It can be expected that developing countries may be attracted to consider SNLTs in sectors for 
which they seek significantly scaled up private sector investment according to their sustainable 
development priorities, and where current carbon market policy tools, such as the various forms 
of CDM, are not considered adequate to the task.  
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• But, SNLTs are unlikely to be feasible for all key sectors, and even for those sectors where they 
may be feasible, this may not be true in all developing countries. Like all credit based 
mechanisms, it is necessary with SNLTs to establish (and have agreed) a baseline, and then 
measure (and report and verify) performance against this. Given that the use of this tool is in 
developing countries, the performance metric is typically framed in intensity terms to ensure that 
it does not operate as a cap on development. Having intensity baselines means the need for 
both the parameters in the numerator and denominator to be measurable – and measured, 
reported and verified. In practice, this limits the applicability of SNLTs in the near term. 
• However, the sectors, and countries, where it may be applicable are significant, so a 
considerable scaling up potential exists. Some likely candidates of sectors (and baseline 
metrics) are: 
– electricity generation: tonnes CO2e per MWh generated. It might also be feasible to do a 
separate sector baseline for resultant emissions associated with electricity losses in 
transmission and distribution systems.  
– cement or aluminium or steel production: tonnes CO2e per tonne produced. Other similar type 
industrial commodities may also be feasible, e.g. bricks, pulp and paper, some chemicals 
including refined oil products, some mining and mineral processing etc. 
– ‘upstream’ emissions of oil and gas production (e.g. gas venting and flaring): tonnes CO2e 
per barrel of oil delivered to refineries or export facilities, or volume of gas delivered. 
• Two variants of the SNLTs concept have emerged, one by the Centre for Clean Air Policy 
(CCAP) and the other by Ecofys/GtripleC. One key distinguishing feature is whether international 
benchmarks would feature explicitly as a negotiation parameter, i.e. to draw links with the 
performance of these sectors in industrialised countries for competitiveness reasons (CCAP 
does; Ecofys/GtripleC doesn’t.) 
• To be successful as means to scale up investments in low carbon technologies and practices in 
developing countries, credit-based mechanisms such as SNLTs rely on there being a demand 
for credits. The carbon market will not function if there is not – carbon will have no value. Given 
the supply of credits already prospectively in the pipeline from existing CDM projects, demand 
from the EU-ETS Phase III (2013-2020) provides limited extra demand, even if the EU takes on 
the -30% target they’ve proposed for 2020 if a comprehensive multilateral agreement is struck in 
the post-2012 period. In short, significant reduction targets of all industrialised countries are 
needed – which is consistent with the science-based calls for reductions of -25 to -40% by 2020. 
And on the supply side, the CDM process needs to be cautious about the automatic renewal of 
projects that have already produced large volumes of credits. 
• This demand-supply balance issue is already leading to a growing awareness that mechanisms 
that may flood the market with large numbers of compliance credits may not be good for the 
overall health of the carbon market. This suggests that there will continue to be close attention to 
baselines, whether these are part of CDM-based mechanisms or of the form of SNLTs.   
 
 
2.1 ‘SCALING UP’, SECTORS AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Any discussion of a specific policy instrument (or ‘tool’) like SNLTs for developing countries 
needs to be placed in the context of what it is that is trying to be achieved. A good sense of this 
has recently been provided in the UNFCCC commissioned study Investment and Financial 
Flows to address Climate Change. Some of the key findings of this ‘I&FF’ study are that: 
(i) To get global emissions in 2030 back to today’s levels, the additional I&FF needed in 
2030 is estimated to be around US$ 200-210 billion, broken down as follows: 
 
- 19 - 
• in energy supply: reduced investment of about 67 billion because of additional 
investment in efficiency and biofuel (included below) 
• in industry: about 36 billion 
• in buildings: about 51 billion 
• in transport: about 88 billion 
• in waste: about 1 billion 
• in agriculture: about 35 billion 
• in forestry: about 21 billion 
• in technology R&D and deployment: about 35-45 billion 
(ii) These additional I&FF amounts are large compared with current funding available under 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, but small in relation to estimated global GDP (0.3-
0.5%) and global investment (1.1-1.7%) in 2030. 
(iii) Investment in new physical assets is projected to triple between 2000 and 2030 so there 
is significant opportunity to direct I&FF in new facilities that are more climate friendly and 
resilient. 
(iv) It is important to focus on the role of private sector investments as they constitute the 
largest share of I&FF (86%). 
(v) Particular attention will be needed to be given to developing countries, because although 
they currently account for only 20-25% of global investments, their expected rapid 
economic growth means that they will require a large share of I&FF.   
(vi) With appropriate policies and/or incentives a substantial part of the additional I&FF 
needed could be covered by the currently available sources. However, improvements in, 
and an optimal combination of, mechanisms such as the carbon markets, the financial 
mechanism of the Convention, ODA, national policies and in some cases new and 
additional resources will be needed to mobilize the necessary I&FF to address climate 
change. 
(vii) The carbon market, which is already playing an important role in shifting private 
investment flows, needs to be significantly expanded to address needs for additional 
I&FF. 
(viii) National policies can assist in shifting I&FF made by private and public investors into 
more climate-friendly alternatives and optimize the use of available funds by spreading 
risk across private and public investors. Additional external funding for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation will be needed, particularly for sectors in developing countries 
that depend on government I&FF. 
 
It needs to be noted that the dollar amounts provided in (i) above are additional I&FF amounts, 
not total amounts. For energy supply, where there are savings of about US$60 billion due to 
additional investment in efficiency and biofuel, the total global investments in the mitigation 
scenario in 2030 are about $695 billion, broken down as: 
• Transmission and Distribution   130 billion 
• Power generation   302 billion 
• Coal, oil and gas supply  263 billion 
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One key point to be taken from these figures is that the scale of investments needed in low 
carbon technology is very large by comparison with today’s levels (as supported by today’s 
mechanisms to encourage low carbon investment). Another key point is the significance of 
investments in the energy supply sector. By their nature these are long-lived capital investments. 
And the scale of investment is very large. These are both key indicators of the importance of 
‘scaling up’ in this sector. 
 
Further sectoral differentiation is provided by recent work of the IEA. Figure 1 is taken from the 
new Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP) 2008 study. 
 
Figure 1: Cutting Energy related CO2 emissions – The 450ppm case 
 
Source IEA (2008) 
 
The key relevance of this IEA ETP (2008) data to the topic of this paper is the sense it provides 
of where the big mitigation potential exists, in particular in power generation, industry and 
transport – with a major contribution from energy efficiency on the end-use side. 
 
These messages have similarly been provided in the recent Fourth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC. Figure 2 below shows emissions reduction potentials in the energy sector. In the right 
hand figure, the reference emissions line is reduced from the top by energy efficiency measures 
and the bottom by supply side measures, leaving the residual gray band declining from about 
9.5 Gt CO2 in 2002 to about 5.0 Gt CO2 in 2030 (instead of rising to about 17 Gt CO2). Figure 2 
additionally provides a sense of geographical mitigation potential in its split of OECD, non-OECD 
and EIT countries.  
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Figure 2: Emission reduction potentials in energy sector 
 
Source. IPCC WG3 SPM 
CO2 emission reduction potentials in the electricity 
sector under US$ 50 per tonne CO2 
 
 
The McKinsey cost curves shown in Figure 3 tell a similar sectoral story and in addition make 
the point that a very significant portion of the mitigation potential is in the negative or low cost 
zone. 
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2.2 MOVING BEYOND TRADITIONAL FUNDING SOURCES 
 
It is unlikely that developing countries will accept any voluntary or mandatory emission 
reductions without a proper financing framework. The underlying assumption of the post-Kyoto 
negotiations, as much as any other negotiations of multilateral environmental agreements in the 
last twenty years, is that the provision of funds is a condition for their participation in any effort to 
address global environmental concerns that are priorities for many policy makers in 
industrialized countries. The calls of developing countries to provide “new and additional” 
financial resources need to be addressed in order to persuade them to sign environmental 
conventions. As industrialized nations are mostly responsible for creating the problem, they are 
expected to facilitate developing countries’ participation in international efforts to mitigate rather 
than worsen the global problem – but, without sacrificing aspirations to improve the welfare of 
their citizens. 
 
Any post-Kyoto agreement that includes emission reductions in defined sectors in developing 
countries must be complemented with a financing mechanism. Traditionally, such mechanisms 
involve the pledge of additional funds by industrialized nations administered by the Global 
Environment Facility. However, developing countries argue that there are three main challenges 
to relying on the modalities of these traditional funding options to climate change.  
 
First, these traditional sources of funding are not always linked to performance or success. 
Traditional official development assistance is targeted towards implementing particular programs 
or projects without sufficient drivers linking funding and performance. Second, GEF and other 
multilateral funding programs are slow and cumbersome and ineffective in involving broader 
sectors of the society. Rooted in intergovernmental cooperation, the existing programs have had 
limited success in involving private sector actors in their programs. 
 
The third shortfall of this traditional funding source is scale. The amount of ODA available is not 
sufficient to address climate change on its own – and it has recently declined as a share of 
OECD countries’ GDP. Figure 4 shows that once debt forgiveness, humanitarian aid, and other 
administration related costs are removed, the remaining ODA (“programmable aid”) tracked by 
the OECD amounted to USD$42 billion in 2006 (excluding Iraq).6  
 







































                                                 
6 OECD, Development Co-operation Report 2007 – Volume 9, No. 1, (OECD: 2008) 
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This amount, however, is for all sectors. In 2006 only 3.9% of all bilateral ODA was directed 
towards energy projects. These numbers were higher within the operations of the World Bank 
(9.6%) and the regional development banks7 (15%), but still fall short of the estimated needs.8 
The GEF, the single biggest environmental trust fund and the financial mechanism for four 
international environmental conventions, administers a fraction of the funding needed to reward 
emission reductions of developing countries in a meaningful way.  
 
Whereas the CDM mobilized EUR4.8 billion in 2006, the GEF received USD3.13 billion in 
August 2006 from thirty-two donor governments for its operations between 2006 and 2010.9 
Proponents of complementing traditional sources of funding with market based approaches 
emphasize that it will be difficult to mobilize the required level of investment and induce GHG 
emission reduction activities at a scale that would be adequate for pursuing the ultimate 
objective of the UNFCCC without significant private sector investment.  
 
Moreover, developing countries will not allow the diversion of ODA for the purpose of rewarding 
emission reductions. This means that existing ODA flows are not a source that can be tapped 
into when creating a new UNFCCC financing mechanism. And even if it were, the amounts of 
funding it could mobilize are not sufficient to help financing the incremental costs of bringing 
large sectors of developing country economies to a low carbon development path. 
 
Traditional sources of funding are, however, needed for capacity building (e.g. supporting 
training and policy development) and other technical assistance (e.g. supporting data collection). 
These sources of funding are essential to creating an enabling environment to stimulate 
reductions. They may be able to finance limited amounts of emission reductions directly, but 
they are not an adequate source of funding to sufficiently reward emission reductions in 
developing countries across the board. Additional funding not sourced from the public sector 
coffers directly are needed for this. 
 
To meet the financing challenge posed by sectoral agreements, intergovernmental funding will 
have to be complemented by new sources of funding and policy measures. Policy measures 
could include carbon taxes, technology standards, policy harmonization or various emission 
targets. Taking into account the limitations posed by traditional international funding 
mechanisms, sectoral agreements with developing countries are usually discussed in the 
context of emissions trading schemes. These primarily involve cap and trade mechanisms for 
industrialised countries, complemented by offset schemes that allow compliance credits to be 
generated through emissions reduction and sink enhancement activities in developing countries.  
 
2.3 A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO ‘SCALING UP’ 
 
The information in section 2.1 can give rise to both optimism and pessimism. On the one hand, 
the UNFCCC I&FF study shows that the additional I&FF flows needed in 2030 to reduce global 
emission to today’s level by 2030 are less than 2% of total global investments in that year. On 
the surface, this would seem a small investment to make to help ensure securing a more stable 
global climate system in the upcoming century. But, on the other hand, changes of even this 
magnitude (small in percentage terms, but ‘large’ in absolute amounts) require a significant 
change from the business-as-usual behaviours of a large number of I&FF actors, public and 
                                                 
7 African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank 
8 OECD, Development Co-operation Report 2007 – Volume 9, No. 1, (OECD: 2008) 
9 See Capoor and Ambrosi, “State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2007”; documents relevant to the GEF fourth 
replenishment are at www.gefweb.org/interior.aspx?id=48. 
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private. This is signalled by the reference lines in the IEA figures compared with the mitigation 
scenario/potential lines. 
 
Scaling up of this magnitude will require very purposeful programs that aggregate on-the-
ground activities. It is instructive to consider what types of ‘actors’ in the economy are best 
suited to aggregate these actions and investments. From there, one can consider what types of 
international and domestic policy environments may lead these ‘natural’ aggregators to want to 
do this.  
 
Vertical aggregations represent a multiplicity of similar actions in a given sector, or sub-sector. 
For example, these could be large scale lighting retrofit or higher efficiency appliance or vehicle 
programs; or conversions to better technologies in industrial sectors such as cement or brick 
making; or investments in renewable electricity generation or ‘CCS-ready’ fossil-based power 
plants; or energy efficiency and fuel switching programs for industrial boilers; or old car 
destruction programs. The main coordinating actors behind these aggregations could be central, 
regional or local governments. Or they could be energy utilities or associations of the industries 
concerned, or multinational companies in specific industries. 
 
Horizontal aggregations represent a multiplicity of actions coordinated by a given main actor 
across a range of sectors, or sub-sectors. An obvious possibility here is local or regional 
government programs that may involve many different types of actions, for example across 
buildings, the transport sector and urban forestry. 
 
The point of delineating things this way is that different enabling policy frameworks at both the 
international and domestic levels are likely to be needed for effective engagement of investment 
in general, and carbon finance in particular. 
 
Importantly, the perspective taken in this work is not that “Carbon finance is the answer....what is 
the question?” Rather it is that countries, industrialised and developing, should be approaching 
the challenge of investing in low carbon futures in a very strategic way. A hierarchy of questions 
could be seen as being: 
• Who are the ‘natural’ key coordinating actors for the desired aggregations? 
o Are they policy makers or policy ‘takers’? 
• To what extent is the provision of financing likely to ‘unlock’ the desired aggregation of 
activity – or are there other key barriers to be overcome or other means to achieve this 
end? 
• Where the provision of financing is key, where might it be available? Among such 
choices, what is the potential role for carbon financing, i.e. where ‘carbon assets’ are 
being generated and acquired? Is it important in a leveraging sense, or can it alone 
provide most of what is needed to tip the economics of the actions sought? 
• Where carbon finance is key, what mechanisms are needed? Is moving from project-by-
project CDM to CDM programs of activity likely to achieve the scale-up needed and 
possible? Or is a sectoral CDM or SNLTs approach preferred? And is it possible that 
financing through the non-compliance voluntary carbon market may be an appropriate 
and quicker route to follow? 
• Implicitly coupled with the notion of acquiring carbon assets, whether in the compliance 
or voluntary markets, is the development of baselines beyond which credits apply. Given 
the preferred carbon finance mechanisms, how are these baselines to be developed? 
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And what institutional process approves these baselines and monitors performance 
against these baselines and issues credits for performance beyond these baselines? 
 
The point, then, is that a policy tool such as SNLTs for developing countries not only needs to be 
seen as just one ‘compliance carbon’10 policy tool among a number of others, but the role and 
applicability of carbon financing needs to be seen in a broader strategic sense. 
 
Indeed, by taking a strategic program approach to low carbon investments, it can be expected 
that all elements, and all carbon finance policy tools, can operate at a scale so far not achieved. 
This includes tool existing today as well as those being considered for the future.  
 
Figure 5, below, is a depiction of how developing countries might implement a program, within 
the type of strategic setting set out by the above questions. 
Figure 5: A strategic program approach including future sectoral ‘compliance carbon’ policy tools 
 
Source: Ward, Garibaldi et al (2008) 
 
2.4 ‘COMPLIANCE CARBON’ POLICY TOOLS11  
 
Scaling up discussions under the UNFCCC primarily relate to (1) broadening the participation in 
the climate regime and (2) means to enhance carbon finance beyond the use of the initial 
                                                 
10 This term is used to distinguish compliance-based carbon finance mechanisms such as the CDM from the 
voluntary carbon market, which has a totally different set of demand drivers 
11 It has become something of a habit for literature to loosely refer to such policy tools as “approaches” (e.g. sectoral 
approach). But to avoid confusion, a distinction is clearly drawn here between overarching policy approaches (e.g. 
the program approach set out above) and policy tools that may be used in the implementing of such programs. 
Compliance carbon policy tools are mostly just different ways of establishing crediting baselines at progressively 
greater levels of aggregation. 
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project-based CDM tool. A variety of policy tools are on the table for ‘scaling up’ from project-
based CDM. Figure 6 illustrates schematically the ‘scaling-up’ continuum of the various policy 
tool options proposed as elements of a future climate regime.  
 
Figure 6. Options for scaling up from project-based CDM 
 
Note that, for this next stage of the climate regime, the continuum does not include that 
developing countries may take on fixed and binding targets, i.e. be part of the Kyoto Protocol-
like ‘cap and trade’ scheme that is expected to still form the basis of the commitments of 
industrialised countries12. In a cap-and-trade system the regulator sets an absolute emissions 
ceiling specified as a given amount of the pollutant that can be released with a defined 
compliance period. The regulatory authority creates and allocates allowances free or by auction, 
in the form of individual allowance, each representing a fixed amount of a pollutant, to the 
various sources under the regime. At the end of a compliance period each participant must hand 
over to the regulatory authority an amount of allowances equal to its emissions in the specified 
compliance period. Examples of such systems include the authorization to transfer AAUs under 
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol and the European Emission Trading Scheme.  
 
Instead, the continuum in Figure 6 represents variations of baseline and credit schemes. Entities 
(or governments) covered by such schemes have to earn the credits before they can use or 
trade them. Participants are given a relative or absolute emission reductions target, which is a 
specific ceiling on emissions for a given compliance period, and then have to reduce the 
emissions against a certain baseline. At the end of the period, participants that have 
demonstrated that they have reduced their emissions as compared to the baseline are granted 
emission reduction credits equalling the difference between the baseline and the actual 
emissions. 
 
In essence, then, the Figure 5 continuum represents a ‘scaling up’ of baseline and credit policy 
tools from the project-by-project version represented by ‘regular CDM’ that, thus far, has been 
the basis of developing country participation in the compliance carbon market initiated by the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Programmatic CDM (pCDM) would allow many project activities to become constituent parts of 
one large CDM project. The distinguishing feature of pCDM is that an unlimited number of 
                                                 
12 This is because developing countries see economy-wide fixed and binding targets in the light of being caps, hence 
constraints on development. Technically this would not be the case if any such targets allowed sufficient head room 
for such development. Indeed a generous allowances based system may be the easiest of all mechanisms to provide 
financial assistance to developing countries. But the current geopolitics of climate change policy appears to rule out 
this option, for now at least. Moreover, having economy wide targets implies robust economy wide national MRV 
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program activities following the same methodology can be added under the ‘umbrella’ of an 
overall given approved pCDM program. 
 
Sectoral CDM would cover a whole sector (or a meaningful part of a sector) of a country as a 
single CDM project. Two different concepts are discussed under the term sectoral CDM. One 
version (multi-project baseline) would grant credits to private entities which emit less than a 
sectoral emission baseline (or benchmark) defined for the sector. This, however, has been seen 
by some as contrary to the logic of additionality under the CDM, as credits would automatically 
be given to all those private actors already producing more efficiently than the baseline. The 
second version (baseline for entire sector) deviates from the traditional CDM thinking of having 
credits granted directly to private companies. It includes the development of a national sector 
baseline (e.g. expressed as the emission intensity of the sector as a whole) by the government 
of a developing country, and thus shifts activities under CDM to the government level. The 
government would be responsible for implementing policies and measures to reduce emissions 
in the sector and would receive credits first if emissions are below the baseline. It may then 
decide to distribute them to plants according to performance. 
 
Policy CDM would allow any activity that falls under a government policy to claim credits, 
potentially over several sectors. But the CDM Executive Board and the COP has struggled with 
this notion because of difficulties to quantify and measure emission reductions actually achieved 
by policies. So the risk of generating excessive credits, thus causing worse environment 
outcomes (than not having this mechanism), is perceived as high. 
 
SNLTs are a form of non-binding emission targets, that could encourage sector-wide emission 
reductions. This idea is based on a similar concept to sectoral CDM of the second version noted 
above. Developing countries could voluntarily propose a sector crediting baseline (most likely a 
national emission intensity of the sector in question over a commitment or ‘management’ period 
of time) which would be negotiated at the international level. Reductions below the baseline 
generate credits issued to the government, but no penalties would occur if the target is not met 
for the whole sector. (See Figure 7) 
 
The main difference between 
sectoral CDM and SNLTs is that the 
technicalities referring to baselines, 
monitoring and verification, as well 
as the supervision and approval by 
the CDM Executive Board, would be 
maintained under a sectoral CDM, 
while the national sector baseline for 
a sector no-lose target would be 
negotiated at the COP level. 
Proponents of the sector no-lose 
target mechanism propose that this 
would be done at the same time as 
Annex I country targets for post-2012 
are being agreed, so additionality 
would no longer need to be an issue 
– as it is not for actions taken by 
Annex I countries that have targets. 
Figure 7. Simple depiction of a sectoral crediting baseline 
 
Source Ecofys/GtripleC (2006) 
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This additionality distinction between SNLTs and any form of CDM is what distinguishes this 
policy tool in particular, and suggests it might have the greatest potential for scaling up 
investments – in appropriate sectors anyway. The single main reason for constraints in the CDM 
is the institutional decision-making processes associated with additionality and environmental 
integrity.  
 
It can be expected that developing countries may be attracted to consider SNLTs in sectors for 
which they seek significantly scaled up private sector investment according to their sustainable 
development priorities, and where current carbon market policy tools, such as the various forms 
of CDM, are not considered adequate to the task. 
 
But, SNLTs are unlikely to be feasible for all key sectors, and even for those sectors where they 
may be feasible, this may not be true in all developing countries. Like all credit based 
mechanisms, it is necessary with SNLTs to establish (and have agreed) a baseline, and then 
measure (and report and verify) performance against this.  
 
The ‘metric’ of this baseline, then, must be something that is measurable in practice and where a 
measured change is representative of reduced tonnes of emissions to the atmosphere (or 
enhanced sequestration). As you move away from project scale CDM projects towards 
something at a sector level this becomes increasingly challenging. Moreover, given that the use 
of this tool is in developing countries, the performance metric is typically framed in intensity13 
terms to ensure that it does not operate as a cap on development. Having intensity baselines 
also means the need for the parameter that is the denominator in the metric to be measurable – 
and measured, reported and verified.  
 
Some examples of possible sectors and baseline metrics are14: 
• electricity generation: tonnes CO2e per MWh generated. It might also be feasible to do a 
separate sector baseline for resultant emissions associated with electricity losses in 
transmission and distribution systems. Note also that this would be tonnes of emissions 
emitted to the atmosphere, so reductions from carbon capture and storage (CCS) would 
be picked up under this metric. 
• cement or aluminium or steel production: tonnes CO2e per tonne produced. Other similar 
type industrial commodities may also be feasible, e.g. bricks, pulp and paper, some 
chemicals including refined oil products, some mining and mineral processing etc 
• ‘upstream’ emissions of oil and gas production (e.g. gas flaring): tonnes CO2e per barrel 
of oil delivered to refineries or export facilities, or volume of gas delivered 
 
Notably, most of these examples are industrial in nature and probably reflect smaller numbers of 
large sources. By comparison, sectors such as buildings and transport have large numbers of 
small sources. A sector no-lose target approach here is much more complex and perhaps not 
feasible – although some sub-sectors may be able to be defined, including perhaps regions of 
                                                 
13 At the end of a given ‘management’ period when the performance of the ‘denominator’ parameter is known, 
intensity targets are able to be converted into absolute tonnes and compared with tonnes of emissions – enabling. 
credits to be issued in ‘tonnes’. 
14 Note that this paper does not include in its scope the sector issue of reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation in developing countries (REDD). However, some of its content can be seen as being as generally 
applicable to REDD as for other sectors in developing countries that are more the focus of this paper. Moreover, in 
section 5.4 it draws from ideas developed in the REDD context on a “nested approach”. 
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sub sectors that are less than national in scale. Note also that this same set of constraint issues 
would apply for sectoral CDM of the second version. 
 
It can be seen that these carbon finance policy tools vary substantially in their characteristics. 
One key element is to whom credits are issued. Under the current CDM and pCDM, they are 
issued directly to the companies involved in the project. But under some options they could be 
issued to national governments. The geographic scope of activities increases when going up the 
scale towards SNLTs. Approval of the baseline methods can lie with the CDM Executive Board 
or, potentially, directly through the COP.  
 
The scaling-up step of granting credits to governments instead of private entities is considered 
one of the most important, and potentially contentious ones. The government would therefore be 
responsible for passing the incentives to reduce emissions on to the private actors. It would be 
the prerogative of the host country to decide how this is done. Host governments could turn to 
any of the range of possible instruments, ranging from regulatory measures such as setting 
standards to market approaches such as a cap-and-trade system.  
 
The set of policies and measures to achieve the targeted emission reductions might therefore be 
very different from one country to the other. Moreover, it is quite likely that policies and 
measures may not be framed in climate change terms, per se. Rather, they may be framed as 
sustainable and development policies and measures (SD-PAMs) addressing a broader set of 
issues including energy security, local environmental quality, health, traffic congestion, etc.  
 
But all this introduces considerable uncertainty to the private sector actors in the carbon market, 
for whom it is critical that they know how they will get the value of the carbon assets created by 
their investments. It has been suggested that this uncertainty may cause capital to flee the 
carbon markets and go elsewhere.  
 
While the above policy tools are set out as options for scaling up, it is likely that a mix of the 
tools will prove to be desirable and necessary. This will be true between and within countries. 
The ideal mix of tools for large rapidly industrialising developing countries is unlikely to be 
suitable for small and less developed countries. Even for the most developed of the developing 
countries, only some sectors may be candidates for the ‘top’ scaling up tool, SNLTs.  
 
The reasons behind this ‘horses for courses’ point are made clearer in Table 1, below. This 
summarizes the different characteristics of the different carbon finance tools for scaling-up 
beyond the classic project-based CDM. Criteria for evaluating tools with regard to their 
desirability are, for example, their prospects for achieving a large-scale transformation of the 
economy/sector, the level of transaction costs to achieve the respective carbon finance, the 
difficulty of determining and dealing with additionality as well as the extent to which the 
mechanism does not only offset emissions (zero-sum), but leads to additional emission 
reduction beyond the one determined by the emissions cap for Annex-I countries. The 
complexity of tools with regard to implementation can be distinguished by criteria like the 
capacity needed at government level and at private-sector level to develop baselines as well as 
the requirements for data availability, monitoring, reporting and verification.  
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Table 1: Characteristics of the scaling-up ‘compliance carbon’ policy tools 
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Colour coding:  Reddish cells indicate limitations or problematic issues. Greenish cells indicate more positive scoring. 
Neutral shaded (but not white) cells are “depends”. 
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From the details in Table 1 it becomes apparent that those tools which have the greatest 
scaling-up potential are also the ones requiring higher government capacity with regard to data 
collection, baseline development, monitoring, reporting and verification. Therefore, only more 
advanced countries will be able to easily participate in those mechanisms which involve setting a 
baseline at a national (or even sub-national) level. “Readiness” capacity building is likely to be a 
necessary pre-requisite and part of an overall program strategy for such countries for relevant 
sectors. 
 
For sectoral CDM and SNLTs, a related issue is the capacity of the multilateral decision-making 
process which is required to agree on more broad-based sector crediting baselines. It is likely 
that neither the CDM Executive Board nor the COP in their current form would be able to handle 
appropriately the complexity of sector baselines. Therefore, for both sector approaches, an 
independent technical advisory body may need to be tasked to support the UNFCCC during the 
technical target setting phase(s) of the post-2012 negotiations. 
 
SNLTs are like Annex I country targets to the extent that additionality does not apply and the 
simpler mechanism of ‘zero-sum’ emissions trading applies, meaning that one tonne of CO2 
reduced in one place can be emitted elsewhere. Also, for such trading to occur relies on a 
sufficient demand for credits coming from Annex I countries.  
 
The national contribution by the host developing country is one means to achieve additional 
emission reductions beyond Annex I targets at the global level. External funding or technological 
support other than carbon financing (e.g. funding of SD-PAMs) may also be used by these 
countries to assist them to achieve outcomes beyond what their self-funded programs may be 
able to achieve. Indeed, in setting the crediting baselines beyond which carbon market financing 
would apply, it will be necessary to understand what such external support is already available 
for low carbon investment in the sectors in question. This is depicted in Figure 8. 
 




With current self funded P&Ms
REFERENCE
With new extnl supported P&Ms
(e.g. SD PAMs, tech funds etc)
With new self funded P&Ms
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15 Also see www.sectoral.org which describes the development of sectoral proposal templates. 
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In thinking about their scaling up priorities, developing countries will need to decide which 
sectors or technologies are most effectively addressed by, say, a pledged sector no-lose target 
and which sectors might be more effectively dealt with by e.g. programmatic CDM or other 
funding mechanisms. These are issues which, by their nature, fit well under the concept of 
developing countries taking a strategic program approach to securing low carbon investment. . 
Since the answers to these questions are very country-specific, there is a need for external 
support of developing countries in analysing their situation at this level of detail and in initiating 
the processes needed to build the capacity for implementing these more scaled-up approaches.  
 
Therefore, an important step in the process will be to start the in-country processes in 
developing countries that will analyse the 
• where do we stand? 
• where do we want to go? 
• what can we achieve by which policies and measures?  
• when do we need to take which steps to achieve this? 
• which sectors/technologies should be addressed by which mechanism? 
• Which data do we have, and where should we increase our knowledge? 
 
Financing will be needed to support developing countries in the technical and analytical work of 
this phase, e.g. filling-out sector proposal templates, studies on cost curves, data collection. It 
will also be needed to build the institutional capacity needed to kick-start and maintain the 
processes. The involvement of key stakeholders, including the private sector actors that are 
likely to be the ones implementing and financing the underlying activities of any emissions 
reduction programs will also be crucial in this phase.  
 
In order to gain sufficient experience to be able to implement such scaled-up policy tools, 
countries can be encouraged to start their internal processes to develop and discuss possible 
baselines. Only learning-by-doing will reveal the relevant problems and tricky issues with regard 
to such scaled-up tools, for example the question of the necessary aggregation level of a 
baseline versus the accuracy of monitoring, reporting and verification of actual emissions at this 
level. These learning processes are essential in order to be able to take well-based decisions on 
a possible policy framework for the post-2012 period. 
 
2.5 VARIATIONS ON A THEME 
 
The idea for SNLTs stems from discussions occurring as far back as 2004 in the Future Actions 
Dialogue facilitated by the Centre for Clean Air Policy (CCAP). Two variants of this idea have 
now developed, largely independent of each other.  
 
Of the two, the CCAP approach16 can be seen as the more prescriptive version. Also it has 
elements intended to ‘speak to’ international competitiveness concerns. This approach would 
focus on the ten largest developing country emitters for each of the major sectors proposed (e.g. 
electricity, iron and steel, chemical and petrochemical, aluminium, cement and limestone, paper 
pulp and printing). A technology and financing package would be provided to these countries to 
offset the costs of their involvement. These costs stem from the requirement for crediting 
baselines to incorporate a non crediting element that represents these countries’ “contribution to 
                                                 
16 See Schmidt et al (2006) 
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the atmosphere”. The competitiveness focused elements relate to the use of pre-set 
benchmarks established by third party independent expert bodies. These benchmarks provide 
the starting out basis for negotiations with developing countries on what their specific crediting 
baselines should be. The benchmarks also are intended to guide allocations for industries in 
these sectors operating in the EU ETS, and presumably other industrialised countries. 
 
The other variant of the sector no-lose target idea, developed by GtripleC and Ecofys, has 
centred around the development of sectoral proposal templates (see www.sectoral.org). The 
purpose of these templates – which could be used by any developing country seeking to 
voluntarily propose such a target within the post-2012 negotiations – is to provide a standardised 
tool by which countries can prepare and propose crediting baselines (see Figure 8). These 
templates are initially seen as a capacity building tool for countries to use internally. In turn, they 
become a negotiation facilitation tool to help the process of negotiations by providing some level 
of standardisation of information, presentation and transparency. The templates include details 
of best practice as it exists in other countries, but as an information item, not with a view to this 
being seen as benchmarks and used as the basis for negotiations. And instead of the notion of 
having a negotiated “technology and finance package”, the templates provide the ‘space’ for 
countries to describe what internationally provided support they may be receiving in the given 
sector (or might receive in the future) that can allow them to achieve lower emissions separate of 
the support of carbon finance.  
 
These summary differences aside, both concepts share the characteristics of these voluntarily 
proposed targets being intended for developing countries and the metric for these targets most 
likely being set in intensity terms, e.g. tonnes CO2 per tonne of cement or per MWh electricity. 
This distinguishes these concepts from so-called ‘transnational sectoral targets’ (or industry 
sectoral targets) where the intent would be targets for industries operating in both industrialised 
and developing countries. 
 
While the CCAP proposal does have an element of this competitiveness-focused thinking in its 
use of international benchmarks, as it applies to developing countries it is clearly in the same 
family of ideas as the GtripleC/Ecofys variant. So to be clear, this paper is explicitly about the 
policy tool of SNLTs for developing countries. In particular, where this paper focuses on 
domestic implementation issues, these should generally apply to either variant of the concept.  
 
2.6 SCALING UP MEANS ON THE DEMAND SIDE TOO! 
 
The case has been made in a range of studies for the need for scaling up investments. 
Moreover, there seems to be an expectation that the private sector, and the carbon market 
specifically, will play a, if not the, major role in providing this investment. But where is the market 
demand to come from? Discussions about enhanced mechanisms serving the supply side such 
as SNLTs will be moot if there is not a compelling answer to this question. 
 
There are reasons for concern. First, the primary demand driver of the market for CERs has 
been the EU ETS. The Commission’s 23 January proposal for amendment of the ETS Directive 
does not provide any demand for imports from new CDM projects starting after 2012 in the 
absence of an international agreement. Second, governments are unlikely to devolve the 
responsibilities associated with their targets agreed to in international negotiations fully to the 
private sector for the following reasons: 
• Governments may exercise a preference for policies other than emissions trading in 
some sectors, such as regulation for energy efficient appliances; 
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• Governments may wish to subsidise low carbon technologies like CCS and renewables 
directly; such efforts have an implied carbon price that will be further enhanced by 
emissions trading either directly or indirectly; 
• Governments may wish to buy CDM or CDM-type credits as a commitment to particular 
sectors, countries or co-benefits such as biodiversity or poverty reduction; to date, public 
procurement in the carbon market has delivered only a small fraction of the financing 
associated with private activity in carbon market. 
 
Third, is the concern about the supply of credits potentially coming from renewal of existing CDM 
projects. CDM projects can be registered for 7 or 10 years. Project activities registered for 7 
years can request renewal for a second and third crediting period. This means that current CDM 
projects registered for 7 years could effectively have a 21 year life cycle if renewal does not 
change the baseline for these projects. For the period 2013-2020, if there is renewal of all 
projects beyond their first crediting period, there is a potential supply of CERs from projects 
already implemented or in the pipeline of about 5.3 billion CERs17, which could easily meet 
import demand from the EU ETS after 2012, significantly limiting the incentive for new 
investment. 
 
Summarising then, for there to be significant new demand for ‘compliance carbon’ 
commensurate with expectations on the supply side, in addition to this renewal issue needing to 
be addressed, industrialised countries (and not just the EU) will need to take on significant 
emission reduction obligations in the post-2012 climate ‘deal’. 
 
But this demand-supply balance issue will also lead to a growing awareness that mechanisms 
that may flood the market with large numbers of compliance credits may not be good for the 
overall health of the carbon market. This suggests that there will continue to be close attention to 
baselines, whether these are part of CDM-based mechanisms or of the form of SNLTs. 
 
                                                 
17 Source: J Fenhann, UNEP Risoe 
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3.    PREPARING FOR SECTOR-NO LOSE TARGETS 
 
Key Messages Of This Section 
• A series of steps can be seen as being needed to get international agreement on SNLTs as a 
new and expanded form of compliance carbon mechanism. This is true at both the national level 
of interested developing countries and at the international intergovernmental level. With COP15 
in Copenhagen ‘looming’, it will be important that the national and international steps proceed in 
parallel – and expeditiously. Care must be taken to ensure these steps do not become 
potentially insurmountable and self-defeating barriers. 
• It is important to not apply a set of expectations of developing countries that are beyond what is 
expected of industrialised countries. SNLTs for developing countries need to be seen in the 
context of targets voluntarily taken on in a multilateral negotiation process. To this extent, they 
are not unlike the targets that will be taken on by industrialised countries, albeit there are some 
key technical differences. Differences in treatment need to be grounded in objective realisations 
of facts, e.g. different capacities and capabilities relating to monitoring, reporting and verification 
(MRV) systems. 
• Significant and targeted capacity building will be needed. This is true within interested 
developing countries and for the multilateral negotiation process itself. A key issue is how the 
post-2012 negotiations are going to cope with the need for objective and accurate data and 
analysis on countries’ national circumstances and proposals that is transparent and accessible. 
This issue applies equally to industrialised countries’ proposals for targets as it does to any 
proposals by developing countries for SNLTs. A neutral technical expert body is needed. But 
how? And where? This mustn’t become a barrier to timely outcomes. 
• Within developing countries, the key national level steps involve: 
– generating national interest and preparing information and data 
– testing the viability of possible sector baselines, e.g. the appropriate baseline metric 
– preparing for national implementation 
The use of proposal templates can facilitate these in-country preparatory efforts. A financing 
package is likely needed for many developing countries to undertake the necessary in-county 
work to get them to the point of being ready to present proposals foe SNLT’s. 
• For the international process, the key steps involve: 
– agreeing on details of the SNLTs mechanism, for example (1) to what extent, if any, issues of 
international competitiveness should be explicitly addressed through measures such as the 
use of sector benchmarks; and (2) what minimum MRV standards should apply (which may 
pre-determine for which sectors this mechanism might be applicable) 
– some expeditious ‘proof of concept’ piloting at either national or sub-national level in key 
candidate sector(s) – e.g. through the World Bank’s Carbon Partnership Facility 
– negotiating sector no lose targets  
• A crucial issue highlighted is the potential timing mismatch between when industrialised 
countries are expected to take on targets and when some key developing countries may be 
ready to negotiate the detail of SNLTs in some key sectors. Some form of ‘doorway mechanism’ 
seems needed. But what? 
THERE IS MUCH WORK TO BE DONE – AND TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE! 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION AND HIGH LEVEL ISSUES  
 
This section focuses on immediate term issues relevant to getting international agreement on 
SNLTs as a new and expanded form of compliance carbon mechanism. Given this is a new 
policy tool, a number of crucial steps are needed to prepare for its application.  
 
A proposed set of steps are summarized in Figure 9 below and described in this section. This 
gives an overview of the tasks that will have to be dealt with on a national level for countries that 
seek to take on sector no-lose target(s), and the negotiations that have to take place on an 
international level. It also provides an illustrative timeframe for these activities. 
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A series of steps can be seen as needed at both the national level of interested developing 
countries and at the international intergovernmental level. In the interests of time and given that 
this new policy tool is proposed as potentially a key new mechanism in the post-2012 period, it 
will be important that the national and international steps proceed in parallel – and expeditiously!  
 
A careful balance needs to be struck in determining which steps are needed and how they are 
framed. If the steps are too onerous or are likely to be particularly contentious, especially where 
these may involve decisions by the UNFCCC COP, these steps can instead turn into potentially 
insurmountable and self-defeating barriers. To the maximum extent possible, the identifying of 
difficulties must be seen as challenges that require immediate attention to overcome, e.g. 
through significant targeted capacity building. 
 
Moreover, it is important to not apply a set of expectations of developing countries that are 
beyond what is expected of industrialised countries, especially where infringements on 
sovereign rights and responsibilities may be perceived. SNLTs need to be seen in the context of 
targets voluntarily taken on in a multilateral negotiation process, as distinct from baselines of a 
CDM type. To this extent, SNLTs are not unlike the targets that will be taken on by industrialised 
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countries, albeit there are some key technical differences18. But in both cases, the ‘beating’ of a 
target has the result of creating tradable emission units – called ‘credits’ in the case of SNLTs 
and AAUs in the case of industrialised country targets. In either case, overly ‘soft’ targets have 
the potential to be a source of excessive supply to the carbon market and undermine its 
effectiveness for all countries.  
 
Any differences in the treatment of prospective targets for industrialised countries and SNLTs for 
developing countries, therefore, need to be grounded in objective realisations of facts. A key 
issue here is the different capacities and capabilities relating to monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) systems, due to the fact that industrialised countries have had nearly ten 
years to prepare for the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period, whereas for developing 
countries, MRV has mostly just been focused at the project level when CDM activities were 
undertaken.  
 
One issue that seems to need the serious and immediate attention of the international 
community is how the post-2012 negotiations are going to cope with the need for objective and 
accurate data and analysis on countries’ national circumstances and proposals that is 
transparent and accessible to all key ‘players’ in the negotiations. By ‘players’ here, it is meant 
both governments and the non government stakeholders (ENGOs, RINGOs, BINGOs, IGOs etc) 
that play close attention to, and can significantly influence the outcome of, the negotiations. This 
issue applies equally to industrialised countries’ proposals for targets as it does to any proposals 
by developing countries for SNLTs.  
 
A neutral technical expert body is needed. However, no single institution currently exists that has 
the breadth of expertise – across energy, industrial processes, waste, forestry and agriculture – 
to address the full economy proposals of industrialised countries or likely proposals for specific 
sectors from developing countries. But pieces of the necessary expertise can be seen in 
organisations such as the IEA, FAO and UNEP, and in working groups of the IPCC, expert 
review teams in the UNFCCC and in the panels and working groups of the CDM Exec Board.  
 
This need for a technical expert body is flagged here as a necessary early step of the 
international process, without further elaboration of how this might be achieved. But the same 
point as made above applies here – this step cannot be allowed to become a potentially 
insurmountable and self-defeating barrier. There are three key issues: (1) Is it agreed that a new 
body is needed, e.g. as distinct from a ‘virtual organisation’ of linked existing institutions; (2) How 
quickly can such a body be formed and be ready to work, and (3) How can it be constituted such 
that it is seen to be capable of providing truly expert, balanced and objective advice.  
 
This body might either be based on already existing institutions within the UNFCCC or be an 
independent technical expert body established outside of the UNFCCC COP process per se but, 
as with the IPCC on climate science issues, a body that the UNFCCC COP process relies on for 
a specific technical purpose. 
 
The outcomes of the work of this body should also be very open and transparent in the process 
– and delivered quickly and frequently. This can help ensure a ‘level playing field’ in terms of 
information being available to all parties to the negotiation. Beyond the basic ‘equity’ aspects of 
this, having such information in the open can help to avoid ‘back room’ political decisions being 
taken with respect to targets (i.e. of a ‘hot air’ or ‘tropical hot air’ nature) that, in time, will be seen 
                                                 
18 In particular, SNLTs are expected to be defined in intensity terms meaning that credits are issued ‘ex-post’ 
following verified performance over a given period. 
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as having a destabilising effect on the carbon market and working against the best interests of 
the overall global mitigation effort.  
 
3.2 NATIONAL LEVEL STEPS  
 
3.2.1 Generating national interest and preparing information and data 
 
A first step is raising awareness of the existence of the SNLTs policy tool. This can be done on 
an international level through information papers. But this also has to be done on a national 
level. For relevant countries19 this has to be done at various levels of the government, and also 
within the industry in a given sector (or sectors) of a given country that might be suitable for this 
approach. Initiative has to be taken to inform the stakeholders by, for example, organizing 
workshops around the subject. This is necessary so that institutions can take ownership of the 
technical exercise that will come.  
 
Once the basics of the approach have been understood, it will become clearer whether general 
interest exists and a first understanding of the capacities in a given country can be gained. It is 
important to keep in mind when approaching the national parties that a key aim of these 
initiatives is to secure the interest and the engagement of private and public financing. It also 
provides countries with a broader base for their climate change mitigation activities. 
 
Within this process it should also be assessed which sectors in a given country might be 
relevant. A key consideration is likely to be sectors that have large and growing emissions, 
where there is a need for significant investment in low carbon technologies and where such 
decisions have significant long-term emission consequences. These investments might be either 
for modernising of existing or for new infrastructure and plant. As noted in section 2.2 and Figure 
3, this determination may best result from a strategic ‘scaling up’ program analysis. It will also 
likely depend on the ‘maturity’ of the sector, which in turn depends on data availability, 
capacities, among other factors. 
 
Once a sector is identified, a special effort has to be made to inform the stakeholders relevant 
on the existence of the approach. It will be helpful to identify one national focal point, most likely 
at government level but in some cases also a private institution that is capable of developing 
capacities to coordinate the further process in the country.  
 
3.2.2 Testing the viability of sectoral baselines 
 
After awareness has been raised and interest is secured from various sides of the private and 
public sector, the viability of establishing a crediting baseline in the given sector(s) needs to be 
tested.20 A key issue is the determination of an appropriate metric for the baseline, which must 
not only be relevant to assessing reductions in emissions through proposed actions in the given 
sector, but also reflect the ability to measure, report and verify the necessary performance 
parameters.21 The use of templates is likely to guide and simplify the testing process.22 Such 
                                                 
19 As will be made evident through this paper, sector no-lose targets are not considered relevant to all developing 
countries.  
20 Testing is already ongoing is several sectors, e.g. in initiatives by CCAP, WRI and Ecofys/GtripleC 
21 For example, a metric in the transport sector such as CO2 emissions per vehicle-kilometres travelled may prove not 
to be practical in many large developing country cities, both for reasons of the unavailability of VKmT data and that 
because of heavy congestion, VKmT is not the most relevant indicator of emissions. 
22 Examples of such templates can be viewed and downloaded at www.sectoral.org . 
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templates give the country the possibility to tell its ‘story’ in a coordinated manner and should 
include quantitative as well as qualitative information.  
 
Since they are used in an early, informal and non-binding stage, proposal templates do not yet 
have to be agreed upon by an international body such as the UNFCCC. It is useful though, if the 
efforts would be coordinated. 
 
Within these templates, indicators should be defined that unify the process and enable a 
transparent comparison across countries. In order to develop such indicators, data has first to be 
gathered. Important characteristics of the data that needs to be gathered are the spatial and 
temporal scope as well as the quality. While an objective even of this test phase is to get and 
use data of the highest possible quality, it is likely that the quality of data may initially be limited. 
Concerning the scope of the data, it needs to be decided whether a country or region wide 
evaluation should be made, and what time span the data should cover.  
 
Prior to moving into the information and data gathering phase, it is necessary to check how 
willing the industry is to cooperate and see whether there are any key issues that will become 
major barriers in the implementation of SNLTs. Issues with industry can arise, for example, if 
companies feel they will be forced to reveal too much data to their competitors if they share the 
data, or if this could lead to anti-trust concerns. Data aggregation by independent third parties is 
needed to get beyond such barriers. 
 
The data collection will most likely be time-consuming and the amount of data needed might 
become extensive. While in some sectors there are a relatively small number of industrial 
operators (e.g. power plants) in other cases this can run to hundreds or thousands (e.g. cement 
in China). Thus, expertise and capacities within the national governments to deal with technical 
issues will be needed. Furthermore cooperation between the national government and the 
industry will be needed. Since the data requirements will have to be set at an early stage, it 
might become necessary to renegotiate the data requirements once more knowledge has been 
gained on the sectoral characteristics.  
 
Once the necessary data has been gathered and the proposal template has been completed, it 
would then be ready for analysis by the technical expert body proposed in section 3.1 and, in 
turn, by the multilateral negotiation process. The expert body could, for example, compare 
templates from different countries, do a quality check on the integrity of the data as well as on 
the usefulness of the indicators chosen.  
 
It would be expected that the review by this body would be made public, e.g. as is the case of in-
country reviews made by the OECD of its member countries and indeed by the UNFCCC review 
teams. Depending on the views of the expert body, countries could review and update their 
proposals prior to presenting them into a multilateral negotiation process. 
 
3.2.3 Preparing for domestic implementation 
 
In parallel to the process that may be occurring at the international level, countries have to 
continue the process that was initiated through any work on sectoral proposal templates. 
Institutions may need to be created and capacities built up and extended. The relevant 
stakeholders, be it governmental or private institutions should be involved more heavily by the 
national focal point for given sectors. This should especially include institutions of the sectors 
that seem most promising. Similar to the proposal templates, a standardized process could be 
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created to facilitate this development, but one which in particular takes account of national 
circumstances. 
 
Besides capacity building, the countries need to start thinking about the implications the 
implementation of SNLTs would have for their country. This includes starting to think of policies 
that could be implemented to achieve the sector no-lose target or go beyond that, or starting to 
figure out how the incentives provided through the credit generation can be passed on from the 
government to the private sector. It might be desirable to start implementing (pilot) policies, as 
policies often only become effective after some time. Section 5 provides a more detailed 
discussion of domestic implementation issues. 
 
3.2.4 Need for an assistance package 
 
All of these “national level” steps can involve significant new efforts in developing countries. A 
pair of very legitimate question that can be expected to be asked by developing countries are  
1. How much time and effort will it take for countries to prepare for, negotiate and effectively 
implement this new policy tool? 
2. In this regard, what financial resources and technical assistance will be needed and 
available? 
 
For many developing countries the viability of them undertaking the efforts in 1 will very much 
depend on the availability of the help in 2. For a given developing country, the needed SNLTs 
assistance package can be expected to cover some or all of the following elements, depending 
on the country’s national circumstances: 
• Data and information gathering, including projections analysis of the economy and the 
sector(s) in question 
• Economic analysis of the cost and benefits of adopting such a mechanism 
• Developing the national level (or sub-national level as applicable) measurement, 
reporting, verification and compliance system for the sector(s) in question 
• Developing the necessary legal framework, including enforcement mechanisms, for the 
implementation of the domestic program of policies and measures and links with the 
international carbon market 
• Enhanced means of engagement with relevant domestic and international private sector 
players and, as applicable, public stakeholders 
 
3.3 INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND STEPS  
 
3.3.1 Agreeing the frame of the sector no-lose targets mechanism 
 
Multilateral negotiations by their nature reflect the interests of all countries, both in broad groups 
and individually. Negotiations under the UNFCCC, in particular, also reflect a general 
‘consensus-based’ process. Taking up a new mechanism such as SNLTs therefore requires a 
general consensus that this is useful to achieving an overall agreement. 
 
Section 2 discussed in some detail one primary objective of a future agreement; that is, to scale 
up the investment in low carbon technologies and practices in developing countries. The key 
feature of SNLTs in this regard is that it moves beyond the institutional constraints that will exist 
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for any carbon market mechanism where additionality is a core requirement. Moreover, for such 
sectors and countries it shifts the focus of climate change mitigation to a sector level – and 
requires management across sectors, not just individual projects or activities. 
 
The potential benefit of scaled up, carbon market financed investment for developing countries 
seems clear. A crucial question is whether industrialised countries feel that the increased scope 
for least cost mitigation, plus mitigation management at a sector level by developing countries, 
provides what they are expecting of such sectors in such developing countries in the post-2012 
regime.  
 
A key underlying issue here is about the international competitiveness of emission intensive 
sectors in industrialised countries – specifically ‘carbon leakage’. Between industrialised 
countries, this concern mostly is displayed through an expectation that all industrialised 
countries will take fixed and binding economy-wide targets. The debate is then how stringent 
should be the reduction targets of individual countries. Of course, within industrialised countries 
there will be domestic policy debates about how such national targets are then distributed 
among specific sectors, especially those perceived to be internationally competitiveness-at-risk. 
But this is largely a domestic policy matter that need not be engaged in by the international 
community. 
 
With respect to SNLTs for developing countries, the way the competitiveness issue is displayed 
is different. It becomes a question of whether industrialised countries, under pressure from their 
domestic industry constituencies, have specific technical requirements for such SNLTs. These, 
for example, may mean that there is an expectation that certain given sectors in certain given 
countries should be covered in such a regime, or that certain technical benchmarks should be 
applied in the determination of appropriate baselines.  
 
It is clear that there is some traction in some industry sectors in some industrialised countries 
that such competitiveness concerns should be given serious consideration in any formulation of 
a new SNLTs mechanism (or, for that matter, in the formulation of any developing country 
commitment). Indeed there is a view in some quarters that global industry agreements in certain 
competitiveness-prone industries sectors (e.g. cement, iron and steel and aluminium) covering 
both industrialised and developing countries are preferable than having these sectors covered 
by SNLTs in developing countries. What is less clear is whether these competitiveness concerns 
have sufficient traction with enough industrialised country governments for this to impact the 
development of negotiation modalities for SNLTs. 
 
In addition to competitiveness concerns, as heralded in section 2.6 and discussed more in 
section 6.3, there may be concerns about the scale of credits that may flow from some sectors if 
sectoral crediting were allowed. This issue is about the potential mismatch of demand and 
supply in the carbon market (i.e. potentially too little demand and too much supply). 
 
If these competitiveness and potential (over) supply concerns become sufficiently important to 
major players in the negotiations, then the following type of decisions might be deemed 
necessary with respect to the development and negotiation of proposals for SNLTs: 
• which sectors are suitable on a national and international level (and which are not), 
including the technical or other criteria by which these judgements might be made  
• the demarcations of the sectors in order to provide for international comparability – while 
for some sectors boundaries are relatively easy to define (e.g. cement sector), this might 
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be more challenging for others (e.g. chemical production). Spill-over effects have to be 
accounted for.   
• what data and information must be provided and the nature and uniformity of this data 
(e.g. for comparability assessments) 
 
It may be desirable to centrally collect data that is comparable across countries. This data could 
inform countries that are proposing national sectoral baselines and other countries and 
institutions to judge the stringency of the proposed baselines. The data may be collected by the 
UNFCCC. It would be of key interest to the technical expert body proposed in section 3.1. 
 
Irrespective of whether these issues become a necessary part of the process of negotiations for 
SNLTs, it can be expected that there will be requirements for a minimum level of sophistication 
and performance of MRV systems for any such sectors. This may have the effect of ruling out 
some sectors in some countries where the MRV systems are not sufficiently mature.  
 
Attention to MRV issues is therefore a critical issue in the national level development and testing 
of the sector no-lose target mechanism. But it may also be a key issue for the international 
process elements discussed in this section, for example the work of the technical expert body. 
Work undertaken under the AP-6 and the current experience with MRV systems under the 
flexible mechanisms can be drawn upon. 
 
Challenges that might be faced in this process could be the availability of data from industry for 
reasons such as competitiveness concerns, especially confidentiality, or institutional barriers 
within the industry. Furthermore, the timeframe within which this has to be achieved could be 
difficult to set, as the amount of data that needs to be gathered might differ tremendously from 
country to country, not only because of the size of a certain country’s sector but also because of 
institutional and political barriers, that might be quiet different across countries.  
 
A key point regarding the issues raised above is that those groups already working proactively 
on methodologies applicable to this mechanism (e.g. sectoral proposal templates) need to get 
some indications as soon as possible from the international community as to the likely required 
technical ‘specifications’ for the information and data necessary to support the negotiations. This 
will help such groups in their ongoing work testing the viability of this mechanism in given 
countries and sectors.  
 
3.3.2  Piloting sector no-lose targets 
 
Given the potential importance of this mechanism, it will be desirable to find some early means 
to pilot test it prior to the final details of the mechanism being set. Countries could volunteer to 
participate that have sectors mature enough for no-lose targets. Within this pilot phase, demand 
for the credits has to be generated (as the country’s sector would no longer be eligible for CDM) 
and additional financing for setting up such an approach will be needed.  
 
The World Bank’s new Carbon Partnership Facility (CPF) provides an opportunity for such 
piloting. It is conceivable that pilot phase activities could be done for some sectors at either 
national or sub-national regional scale. A number of the proposed possible pilot initiatives 
identified by the World Bank for the CPF, in particular large scale renewable electricity 
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3.3.3  Negotiating sector no-lose targets 
 
At some point, the multilateral post-2012 negotiation process will be ready to consider proposals 
for SNLTs that are being put forward by some developing countries. Figure 8 in section 2.4 
depicted the nature of what such proposals may look like. In particular a number of emissions 
intensity performance ‘lines’ are shown over a future period of time. To recap, this set of lines 
includes:  
• a reference line, representing the projected emissions intensity including currently 
implemented national policies and measures relevant to emissions in this sector and 
existing known levels of external funding or financial support, including CDM projects in 
the sector 
• the sector crediting baseline (the proposed sector no-lose target) which reflects the 
contribution to reduced emissions intensity from enhanced national policies and 
measures and foreseeable new external funding and financial support (e.g. from 
technology/funding support packages proposed to be included in the new agreement for 
SD-PAMs or other reasons, or from complementary initiatives such as the APP, new 
World Bank managed funds etc) 
• an ‘ambition’ line, which provides an indication of the possible improvements in 
emissions intensity (e.g. realisable technical potential) that may be achieved with the 
carbon financing (i.e. credits) from the SNLTs mechanism23 
 
Coupled with the qualitative information behind these lines, the country’s national story as it 
were, this information provides the basis for the negotiation and eventual acceptance of a sector 
no-lose target.  
 
As noted above, the proposal and information contained therein should already have been 
through some form of objective technical assessment process by an independent technical 
expert body. The assessment, and any subsequent revisions to the proposal that the country 
may have made, would be public knowledge to the negotiating process. However, the 
negotiations themselves would follow whatever process is agreed to be taken by the Parties. 
Presumably this should be the same for the negotiation of both industrialised countries’ targets 
and any developing countries’ SNLTs. Ideally a high degree of transparency will prevail, but the 
nature of international multilateral negotiations is such that final agreements are often only 
achievable in a somewhat less than transparent setting. 
 
A Crucial Issue – Timing mismatch 
 
A significant issue for the negotiations that is relevant in particular to SNLTs, is that it cannot be 
expected that every developing country that may be interested to propose SNLTs will be ready 
to do so at the time that the international community expects the main details of the post-2012 
multilateral climate change ‘deal’ to be agreed (e.g. in late 2009). The underlying issue here is 
the carbon market demand and supply issue discussed in section 2.6. In short, there are clear 
links between the targets that industrialised countries take on and SNLTs. These links are quite 
complex, politically and technically: 
(i) If there is the will among industrialised countries to take on deep reduction targets, there 
will be a greater concern about the potential costs and a greater interest in the scale of 
                                                 
23 A key value of this line is that it can give others in the negotiations a sense of the credits that may enter on the 
supply side of the market. 
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lower cost abatement opportunities that may enter into the overall emissions trading 
system from credits from the SNLTs mechanism. Moreover, the reason that this political 
will exists in some industrialised countries may be because some key sectors in some 
key countries are covered under SNLTs. 
(ii) On the other hand, if the will of some key industrialised countries is less than is hoped by 
others, the overall ambition of industrialised countries may not be so great as to create a 
huge demand for credits from SNLTs to keep carbon prices at what are seen as 
reasonable levels. In this circumstance the ‘mood’ about SNLTs could be quite different, 
i.e. it will be affected by concerns that mechanisms that may ‘flood’ the market with large 
numbers of relatively low cost credits may not be good for the overall health of the 
carbon market, or the climate change mitigation challenge. 
(iii) There is an obvious potential for a dynamic interplay between the circumstances of (i) 
and (ii). This challenge for the negotiations warrants significant diplomatic skills being 
brought to bear during (and before) the key negotiations of targets. 
 
However, all this is somewhat moot if the details of potentially key developing countries’ SNLTs 
are far from being clear at the time the ‘hard’ negotiations of industrialised countries’ targets are 
happening.  
 
All this suggests that a ‘doorway mechanism’ of some form needs to be part of the main 
agreement that leaves open the option of such SNLTs to be added to the agreement at a later 
time. Part of this mechanism would have to address what happens to industrialised country 
targets that have already been agreed. 
 
A number of theoretical options exist for a mechanism to address this timing mismatch problem: 
• Industrialised countries could agree on stringent emission reduction targets in 2009/10 
with an explicit condition that a certain number of key developing countries adopt SNLTs 
in key sectors by the end of 2011. But this would not be satisfactory as it may imply that 
the agreement in 2009 will turn out to actually not be an agreement. 
• Industrialised countries’ targets could be automatically made more stringent as a function 
of the size of developing countries and sectors with SNLTs. This would provide an 
incentive for developing countries to assume such targets, as it automatically creates 
demand for such credits. But the political (un)feasibility of having such uncertainty for 
industrialised countries is likely to rule out such a ‘ratcheting’ option. 
• The agreement could create a separate requirement (in essence a second target) for 
industrialised countries to purchase credits from SNLTs. If not enough credits from 
SNLTs are available, units from the primary carbon can also be used (AAUs, CERs, 
ERUs). This option is based on a CCAP “dual markets” proposal for REDD. The problem 
here is that the purchasing decision of industrialised countries in this second market has 
to be taken ‘ex-post’ at the end of the commitment period. Not knowing what the supply 
of SNLT credits are available to fulfil these second targets (hence how many primary 
market units may be needed) can cause great uncertainty on, and possible volatile shifts 
in the carbon price in, the primary carbon market. 
• At the time that the industrialised countries agree their targets, a ‘budget’ could be 
established for the number of credits from developing country SNLTs. This can address 
concerns of possible over-supply of credits entering the system based on later 
agreements for SNLTs. But like any ‘caps’ or restrictions it raises questions about ‘who 
gets served first’ and can have the effect of disincentivising actions in the future that may 
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be highly desirable. Moreover there is no guarantee that this budget will be taken up, so 
this may raise concerns on the industrialised country side about the targets they’ve 
agreed to take on. 
 
More work is needed on this timing mismatch issue. The best option, of course, is for an 
immediately implemented accelerated capacity building and diplomatic effort, such that details of 
potential SNLTs in some key sectors in some key countries can be well advanced at the time 
industrialised countries are agreeing their next targets. These could then be finalised in the 
period between when industrialised countries agree their targets and then the overall package of 
the ‘deal’ is ratified by domestic governments. 
 
3.4 ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH SECTOR NO-LOSE TARGETS – AND 
ISSUING CREDITS 
 
Once the SNLTs have been agreed upon for a specific country on an international level, the 
same tools can be used for assessing compliance as are currently used for industrialised 
country national emission targets. These include the national emission inventory reports that 
have to be submitted to the UNFCCC every year and that are supported by reporting guidelines.  
 
For SNLTs, these could be limited to the sector of the no-lose target, and varied as needed to fit 
the circumstances. One key issue is the period of such inventory submissions, noting that credits 
are only to be issued ex-post based on assessed performance.  
 
The national inventory reports would then be reviewed by an international team of experts. The 
review teams would also assess whether the emissions are below or above the sector crediting 
baseline and propose the number of credits to be issued. The compliance with the target and 
recommendation of the review team with respect to credits issuance would then be accepted by 
the COP. In the event of any dispute about this, the matter would be forwarded to the 
compliance committee for resolution. 
 
3.5 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
Immediate term issues that are relevant to getting an international agreement for SNLTs have 
been described in this section. These show that a large amount of work is lying ahead and many 
challenges will have to be mastered. As can be seen a great number of preparatory steps are 
still necessary. The priority is to initiate the process as soon as possible. Even with an early 
start, the process for setting up SNLTs will need some time. Various steps will have to be taken 
by the countries interested in such approach and within international negotiations. International 
and national preparations will have to run in parallel and feedback between each other. 
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4.    SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, DOMESTIC 
POLICIES AND MEASURES, AND SECTORS  
 
Key Messages Of This Section 
SD-PAMs in general 
• SD-PAMs is a strategic approach involving a commitment by developing countries based on 
choosing a development path that results in lowered emissions, rather than an explicit climate target. 
SD-PAMs commitments by developing countries would be to implement sustainable development 
policies, which through associated MRV can be shown to have beneficial climate change outcomes. 
• The implementation of SD PAMs in developing countries, including MRV systems, requires 
assistance through capacity building, technology and funding mechanisms (but not carbon financing) 
provided by industrialised countries – per Article 4.3 of the UNFCCC. 
• Given such assistance, the SD-PAMs approach has the potential to mobilise the largest source of 
finance, that is, domestic investment. National policies, particularly those focused on development, 
by their sheer scale have large potential to shift investments. The challenge is to move both public 
and private investments into climate-friendly policies and technologies. It is in influencing these larger 
flows that external funding can play a leveraging role. 
• Given that ‘climate beneficial’ outcomes of SD PAMs are not financed through the carbon market 
(carbon credits), such benefits to the climate are absolute – and should be recognised and 
encouraged as such. 
Linkages between SD PAMS and SNLTs 
• There are several similarities between SNLTs and SD-PAMs, as well as some differences. On the 
similarities side, both are voluntary and country-based in their nature and involve bottom-up pledges. 
Both SNLTs and SD-PAMs seek to recognise action already being taken by developing countries 
and to incentivise further action. 
• SD-PAMs are in principle applicable across entire economies, in virtually any sector or across 
sectors. In practice, countries will choose SD-PAMs that support national priorities, within or across 
sectors. 
• In practice, SNLTs are not seen as viable for all sectors, nor for a given sector in all developing 
countries. The space potentially occupied by SNLTs therefore would be narrower than SD-PAMs, but 
where it is applicable it can be expected to overlap with SD-PAMs. 
• But this overlap between SD-PAMs and SNLTs can be seen as complementary, rather than 
conflicting. SD-PAMs could be thought of as being a (or the) primary contributor to the wedge 
between a sector reference line and a sector crediting baseline – i.e. the wedge showing as being 
funded by new external support but not the international carbon market (refer Figure 8) 
• Ultimately, it is not the order of wedges that is fundamentally important, but that implemented 
together and supported respectively by public (SD-PAMs) and private (carbon finance) money, the 
overall emission reductions can be greater. However, both need to be discussed together in the 
multilateral negotiation process where developing countries are seeking the agreement of others to 
their proposals for SD-PAMs and SNLTs. Indeed, the understanding of how forthcoming the 
international community will be in terms of the external (public) support for the proposed SD-PAMs 
initiatives in a given sector is key to the setting of any SNLT (crediting baseline) in that same sector. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
While international policy frameworks that include mechanisms for international funding and 
financing can, as is implied, help frame potential outcomes at the country level, it is ultimately 
on-the-ground activities that reduce emissions and enhance sinks. Domestic policies and 
measures arguably have the greatest influence. 
 
Section 2.2 and Figure 3 touched on domestic policies and measures in a strategic sense, i.e. its 
advocating that countries take a program approach to low carbon investment. But, to date, the 
most significant contribution in the post-2012 policy literature on domestic policies and measures 
for developing countries has been on the topic of sustainable development policies and 
measures (SD-PAMs). This addresses the question of how developing countries might 
implement domestic policy more effectively, both to promote their own sustainable development, 
but also with the co-benefit of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
The purpose of this section is to present the concepts and detail of the SD-PAMs approach and 
explore what synergies and links there may be with domestic policy implementation in sectors 
for which countries have taken on a sector no-lose target.  
 
This discussion on SD-PAMs takes as its starting givens that : 
• The pace of climate negotiations needs to step up significantly to deal with the urgency of 
the challenge posed by the science and economics of climate change. To achieve the 
objective of the UN Climate Convention, deeper emission reductions will be required in 
all industrialised countries, but the growth of emissions in developing countries also 
needs to slow quickly. 
• Meaningful participation by developing countries may take several forms. SD-PAMs is an 
approach for developing countries that starts from sustainable development – which is 
part of the UNFCCC objective – rather than climate targets. Not only does Article 2 of the 
Convention require stabilisation on concentrations to be achieved in a manner that does 
not prejudice sustainable development, but the right to promote sustainable development 
is a Convention principle as well (UNFCCC 1992). 
 
4.2 WHAT ARE SD-PAMs? 
 
SD-PAMs is a strategic approach involving a commitment based on choosing a development 
path that results in lowered emissions, rather than an explicit climate target, i.e. targets to reduce 
or limit GHG emissions. It comprises policies and measures that are firmly within the national 
sustainable development priorities of developing countries, which through inclusion in the multi-
lateral climate framework seeks to recognize, promote and support means of meeting these 
policy priorities in a lower-carbon development path.   
 
The SD-PAMs commitment would be to implement sustainable development policies.   
 
The SD-PAMs approach starts from development objectives, and then identifies more 
sustainable pathways to achieve such objectives. In terms of the conception of a strategic 
program as outlined in section 2.2, therefore, the sectoral umbrella program (or implementation 
plan) would be defined primarily in terms of local development objectives. Reducing GHG 
emissions are a co-benefit of making development more sustainable (Munasinghe 2002; 
Sathaye et al. 2007). Indeed, the umbrella program or implementation plan may in many cases 
best be defined within domestic sectors. That is how many governments do business. Due 
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attention must also, however, be paid to the importance of policy alignment and coordination 
across sectors.  
 
SD-PAMs could include a large range of national or sectoral policies with a direct impact on 
GHG emissions. Examples would include increasing electrification (if the fuel mix for electricity 
generation displaces more emissions-intensive sources), in which case the SD-PAM would 
apply specifically to electricity use in households. Improving energy efficiency would be a major 
SD-PAM (Winkler, Howells & Baumert 2007), but while it might be considered an intervention  
limited to the ‘electricity’ sector, it applies across economic sectors of industry, commerce and 




Examples of SD-PAMs  
Rural electrification in India seeks to empower the 56% of households that remain without 
electricity supply. The development challenge is that 500 to 600 million people remain 
without access to electricity. Three paths were examined in a study (Dubash & Bradley 
2005) – (1) a ‘grid first’ approach has little chance of meeting electrification targets; (2) a 
strategic approach of ‘diesel first’ raises concerns about the cost of oil imports, security of 
supply and local air pollution; and (3) ‘Renewables first’ provides benefits, contributing to 
rural electrification, but at significant incremental capital costs (Dubash & Bradley 2005). 
Given concerns raised about the grid and diesel technologies, there are important reasons 
for India to prefer renewable energy on domestic policy grounds. Renewables already play 
an important role in rural electrification (measured in % population with access) and 
continue to contribute without adding to dependence of imports. The diesel scenario, by 
contrast, adds some $21 billion per year to India’s import bill (as a share of total, this could 
be the SD units reported). Favouring renewable energy sources brings significant CO2 
emission savings: between 14 and 100 million tons of CO2 compared to using the grid 
(Dubash & Bradley 2005).  
 
Not all examples are positive. There are also examples of policies that are pure climate 
policies.  Carbon capture and storage is perhaps the clearest example. As an end-of-pipe 
technology directly seeking to store CO2  as a waste product, it has little benefit for local 
sustainable development (Mwakasonda & Winkler 2005). Equally, there are examples 
where policies may be good for local development, and even sustainable, but increasing 
emissions. Increased rates of electrification, absent any change in the fuel mix, would 
increase GHG emissions (Winkler et al. 2002c).  
 
Other positive case studies include energy-efficient low-cost housing in South Africa is one 
example of a SD-PAM, with the potential to remove the housing backlog while reducing 
emissions compared to a coal-fired grid (Spalding-Fecher, Mqadi & Oganne 2003; Winkler 
et al. 2002d). Avoided emissions come together with substantial local sustainable 
development benefits – household energy savings (Rand / household / month), reduced 
indoor air pollution (another SD unit), improved health and increased levels of comfort. 
Experience at the project level has quantified some of these benefits – not only a level of 
thermal comfort at 21ºC (as the SD unit was defined in this case), but less active space 
heating that reduces energy bills by some R625 (ca. $100) per household per year (SSN 
2004).  
 
If implemented at larger scale – e.g. applied through policy to all housing, not just a single 
project - avoided emissions might range between 0.05 – 0.6 Mt CO2-eq if implemented at 
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policy (Winkler, Howells & Baumert 2005). The climate co-benefits are relatively small, 
since poor households use less energy than richer ones; the savings at most account for a 
reduction of 7% of residential CO2 emissions or 0.2% of national emissions (Winkler et al. 
2002c).  
 
Further examples of the use of case studies in China’s energy sector (Kejun, Xiulan & 
Qiang 2006), including China’s efforts to reduce air pollution in the process of motorisation 
(Wei-Shiuen & Schipper 2005). In the Brazilian case (La Rovere, Pereira & Simões 2006; 
Moreira, Nogueira & Parente 2005), the ethanol program produces approximately one third 
of Brazil’s transport fuel, has saved $100 billion in foreign currency expenditure, has 
created over a million rural jobs and has climate co-benefits estimated at 574 million tons 
of CO2 over the lifetime of the program. These measures suggest that these may be 
meaningful SD units in Brazil. Without the biofuels program, Brazil’s cumulative emissions 
of CO2 from 1975 to the present would have been 10% higher (Moreira et al. 2005). 
    
 
The co-benefits of making development more sustainable – that is avoiding increased GHG 
emissions through a low-carbon development path – are well-recognised in the IPCC’s Fourth 
Assessment Report (Sathaye et al. 2007). Climate policy alone will not solve the climate problem 
– changing development to a lower-carbon path is at least as important as explicit climate policy. 
Areas that have historically not been thought of as climate policy - macroeconomic policy, 
agricultural policy, multilateral development bank lending, insurance practices, electricity market 
reform, energy security and forest conservation - can significantly reduce emissions (IPCC 
2007). The SD-PAMs approach seeks to capture the potential of co-benefits in a way that can 
be integrated into the architecture of the multi-lateral climate regime.  
 
The SD-PAMs approach was originally developed as part of early considerations of new options 
for post-2012 (Winkler et al. 2002a). A variety of case studies have been developed to illustrate 
how the concept might be applied in a range of developing countries (Dubash & Bradley 2005; 
Moreira et al. 2005; Wei-Shiuen & Schipper 2005; Winkler et al. 2007; Winkler et al. 2002b). 
Methodological work has been undertaken to consider how the benefits of SD-PAMs might be 
quantified, including case study approaches but also  
Through  national energy modelling, analysis of sectoral data and inclusion of policies in global 
emission allocation models  (Winkler, Höhne & Den Elzen in press 2008).  
 
The approach was introduced into discussions as part of the Convention Dialogue on long-term 
cooperative action (RSA 2006). In the negotiations culminating in the Bali Action Plan, the 
approach was referred to by several delegations. SD-PAMs are one approach that would fit the 
description of  “nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the 
context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and 
capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner” (UNFCCC 2007a). 
 
The SD-PAMs commitment rests on the implementation of policy – domestic policy that meets 
local sustainable development objectives. How likely it might be that SD-PAMs are realised will 
depend in part on the design in the multilateral context, but perhaps in even greater part of the 
political, institutional and public support that the pledged policies enjoy domestically. The 
following section turns to an analysis of SD-PAMs by various architectural considerations.  
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4.3 ARCHITECTURAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SD-PAMs 
 
A number of architectural features of the SD-PAMs approach are worth highlighting:  
Forum 
SD-PAMs would be negotiated under the framework of the UNFCCC, but synergies exist with 
forums and agencies focused on sustainable development, such as the Commission on 
Sustainable Development and national agencies dedicated to sustainable development.  
Eligibility 
As a form of commitment SD-PAMs would only be applicable to developing countries, while 
policies and measures for industrialised countries are a means of implementing quantified 
emission reduction targets.  
Objectives 
The goals of SD-PAMs are framed in the first instance in terms of development, rather than 
climate. The approach starts by considering a country’s own long-term development objectives, 
and then identifies policies and measures are identified that would make the development path 
more sustainable. In the context of the climate negotiations, SD-PAMs also include GHG 
objectives – as co-benefits of the more sustainable development path.  
Scope 
SD-PAMs are in principle applicable across entire economies, in virtually any sector or across 
sectors. Some SD-PAMs might be implemented within a specific sector, for example residential 
solar water heating would be implemented in a fairly well-defined sector, housing. Other SD-
PAMs, for example efficiency measures or air quality standards, would cut across sectors.  
National circumstances 
SD-PAMs are designed to achieve national development objectives in a more sustainable 
manner. The approach starts by considering a country’s own long-term development objectives. 
Next, policies and measures are identified that would make the development path more 
sustainable. By design, therefore, SD-PAMs are sensitive to national circumstances. 
Furthermore, no harmonised list of SD-PAMs would be imposed on any country, but rather each 
country would define how it can achieve its own development objectives more sustainably – and 
agree to report the GHG co-benefits internationally.   
Flexibility 
SD-PAMs are by design sensitive to national circumstances, such as the structure of the 
economy, natural resource endowments, domestic industrial strategies and other factors. Under 
SD-PAMs, there would simply be self-selection for the focus on action. (The potential down-side 
of this approach is that sustainable development is so broad as to lack the focus require to 
galvanise action in key sectors.)  
Legal nature of commitment 
SD-PAMs commitments would take the form of a voluntary pledge within the multilateral regime. 
Developing countries voluntarily identify the policies and measures they wish to pursue. The 
mitigation actions taken could be acknowledged and recorded in a register.  
Institutional and public support 
While the legal nature of international commitments needs clear definition, the effective 
implementation of policy in developing countries perhaps depends to a greater degree on 
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domestic support. The bottom-up definition of SD-PAMs – from each country’s own development 
objectives – makes political, institutional and broader public support more likely than for targets 
set internationally. Through this design, domestic policies and programs are likely to have the 
support not only of national governments, but also of major domestic institutions, and are hence 
more likely to be implemented.  
Accountability procedures 
It would be desirable to measure progress on both local sustainable development and GHG 
benefits. In so far as they are supported by finance and enabled by technology, it would be 
reasonable for implementation of SD-PAMs to be reported. The meaningful contribution by 
developing countries to mitigation would be more fully acknowledged in reports that could either 
form part of national communications or a separate format. However, as a voluntary measure 
there would be no compliance system. Accountability is important domestically at least as much 
as internationally. Strong stakeholder engagement in the design, monitoring and review of SD-
PAMs will contribute to more effective implementation of national policies. 
Environmental effectiveness 
The effectiveness depends on the scale of SD-PAMs pledged and, critically, on the extent to 
which they are implemented. Common conceptions that bottom-up approaches such as SD-
PAMs are by definition less effective than top-down allocations are erroneous – in either 
instance, efficacy can only be assessed if the stringency of the target set is known, as well as its 
realisation – i.e. whether the goal has been achieved. In so far as SD-PAMs expands action 
beyond the limitations of projects to larger-scale policy-based action, it has the potential to 
enhance environmental effectiveness.   
Timing and triggers 
The approach would be available to all developing countries without an entire new climate 
regime. It would require ‘only’ COP decisions. 
Finance 
SD-PAMs can be financed from a variety of sources – climate and development funding; 
domestic and international sources. The approach taken in this paper is that SD-PAMs would 
not be linked to carbon markets, avoiding issues of additionality and baselines.24 If SD-PAMs 
were linked to markets (as suggested in other analyses (Ellis, Baron & Buchner 2007)), they 
would be very similar to policy CDM.  
 
Further discussion of architectural issues, and how SD-PAMs might be implemented under the 
Convention, have been outlined previously (Baumert & Winkler 2005; Bradley & Pershing 2005; 
Ellis et al. 2007). The focus of this paper, however, is on SNLTs. It now takes up the comparison 
of SD-PAMs with this variant of sectoral approaches for developing countries. 
 
                                                 
24 If SD-PAMs were linked to markets (as suggested in other analyses (Ellis, Baron & Buchner 2007)), they would 
be very similar to policy CDM. 
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4.4 FUNDING DIFFERENT KINDS OF SD-PAMs 
 
Several varieties of SD-PAMs are possible, as the range of variations identified by Ellis and 
Baron (2007) makes clear.25 SD-PAMs as proposed in this paper would be funded from non-
market sources only. Several reasons that would support taking this approach, include:  
• SD-PAMs are focus on development first, with climate as a co-benefit. Funding streams 
that focus on (sustainable) development seem appropriate. 
• Development activities often require up-front funding, rather than ex post incentives that 
may be delivered only years later by the carbon markets.  
• Market-based funding immediately raises the issues encountered in the CDM, notably of 
additionality and baselines. 
• Restricting SD-PAMs funding to non-carbon-market sources keeps the proposal distinct. 
The book containing the original SD-PAMs proposal also contained a chapter on sectoral 
CDM (Samaniego & Figueres 2002), the key difference being the explicit funding from 
CERs for the latter.  
• Looking back to 1992, there is a long-standing commitment by Annex II Parties to fund 
the agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures and full costs of formulation 
and reporting (UNFCCC Art 4.3). This was not contingent on the sale of carbon credits.  
 
Looking to the future, it is clear that no single source of funding will meet all needs. More 
specifically, the estimates of the future scale of the carbon markets indicate that this will meet at 
best half of the needs of developing countries. A UNFCCC Secretariat paper estimated that 46% 
of the $200 – 210 billion investment in mitigation in 2030 would be in developing countries 
(yielding 68% of the emission reductions). So roughly $90-100 billion would be needed in 
developing countries – but the size of the carbon market is estimated between $ 10-100 billion 
(UNFCCC 2007b: the ‘I&FF’ study). Hence the paper found that the carbon market “would have 
to be significantly expanded to address needs for additional investment and financial flows” 
(UNFCCC 2007b: para 6).  
 
The carbon market on its own is unlikely to meet all needs, as outlined in section 2 of this paper.  
Figure 10 makes apparent that the large flows are domestic investment, with foreign direct 
investment a distant second. To show up to the scale, the revenues from CER sales from all 
projects in the CDM pipeline was estimated at $ 5 billion, which like ODA in 2006 is barely visible 
in this comparison.  
 
                                                 
25 Ellis and Baron (2007) suggest three broad categories: SD-PAMs generate credit; SD-PAMs are encouraged by 
means other than credits; and SD-PAMs generate recognition only. Within this theoretical spectrum, this paper 
focuses only on the second option.  
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Source: Own analysis, based on data in UNFCCC (2007b) 
 
Similarly, of course, the funding under the financial mechanism of the Convention would also 
have to increase by two orders of magnitude. 11 shows the two smaller bars from the previous 
graph (10), that is ODA26 and27 CERs from the CDM pipeline. Compared to the funds flowing 
through the Global Environment Facility, these now appear relatively large. Funding in for the 
adaptation pilot activities, and pledges for the LDC Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund 
are small in this context. The earlier analysis in section 2 can also be turned around – even large 
absolute amounts are small in relative terms.  
 
                                                 
26 ODA funds less than 1 % of investment globally, but this rises to over 2 % in Africa and over 6 % in LDCs 
(UNFCCC 2007b: para 37) 
27 The revenue from CER sales was estimated at $ 5 billion, with total investment in the overall projects in the 
pipeline in 2006 at $ 25 billion.  
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The SD-PAMs approach has the potential to mobilise the largest source of finance, that is, 
domestic investment. National policies, particularly those focused on development, by their 
sheer scale have large potential to shift investments, beyond the scale of investment by 
developing countries already seen in project-based investment in unilateral CDM. The challenge 
is to move both public and private investments into climate-friendly policies and technologies. It 
is in influencing these larger flows that external funding can play a leveraging role. This type of 
funding is likely to be important in particular sectors in developing countries, notably those that 
depend on government investment and financial flows (UNFCCC 2007b: para 28).  
 
As noted above, under the description of SD-PAMs in this paper, funding for SD-PAMs would 
not come from the carbon market. Several sources of public funding have been identified, from 
levies on international air travel, through funds to invest foreign exchange reserves, debt-for-
efficiency swap to donated special drawing rights. It should also be remembered that there are 
markets other than carbon markets, and a Tobin tax for example is an economic instrument that 
could raise $15-20 billion (UNFCCC 2007b: para 28).  
 
If the money supply could be increased, how might it be spent? The proposal for SD-PAMs is 
that funding would essentially go to governments, who would allocate it to specific policies.  
 
Taking renewables as an example, governments that pledged to implement a Renewable 
Portfolio Standard might use the funding to fund x MW to implement this policy. If the option was 
for a feed-in tariff, the funding might be channeled to utility or municipal distributors to support 
the payment of higher tariffs for renewable electricity. For energy efficiency SD-PAMs, the 
funding might be dedicated to program costs, since they pay for themselves over time (with the 
possible exception of poor households, who might need grant funding for equipment). Again, it 
would be up to governments to channel the funding.  
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Money is one thing, spending it in a way that makes a difference is another. The next section 
looks at the importance of institutions in implementing domestic policies of the kind envisaged by 
SD-PAMs.  
 
4.5 IMPLEMENTING DOMESTIC POLICY – THE IMPORTANCE OF 
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 
 
A South Africa case example 
 
Institutional capacity at the national level will be critical to implementing SD-PAMs. This factor is 
at least as important in the realization of policies and measures in a developing country (if not 
more so), as the legally-binding nature of international commitments. An example from South 
Africa might help illustrate the point.28  
 
Institutional arrangements clearly vary considerably across developing countries. In this section, 
we continue the case-study of South Africa. There is no central Ministry or department solely 
responsible for development in South Africa. While the Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism would be the focal point for issues of sustainable development, many other 
departments deal with the issue in relation to their core function. 
 
Even at national level, energy efficiency targets are to date defined by a voluntary agreement 
between government and business. The target is to reduce energy consumption by 12% below 
projected levels by 2015, with some sectors taking on a 15% target. Progress to date has been 
mixed. For industrial energy efficiency, key energy industries, such as the electric utility Eskom, 
the synfuel company Sasol, and other industry sectors (chemicals, mining), would need to be 
centrally involved in implementing any SD-PAMs.  
 
Public support and confidence by a broader set of national stakeholders – including NGOs and 
consumer organizations – for the target would further increase the likelihood of realizing the 
target. Public reporting of progress against targets is critical in this regard.  
 
Figure 12 below shows that several institutions are involved in measuring and verifying energy 
savings. Eskom, the electricity utility, has a demand-side management program. The 
implementation of the program is outsourced to energy service companies (ESCOs), which 
assist clients in industry, commerce and the residential sector. The ESCOs carry out specific 
interventions for companies in industry (the client in Figure 12). 
 
Four universities in South Africa are involved in measurement and verification (M&V) teams. 
These teams are employed by the utility to measure the savings against an energy baseline 
established prior to the intervention. After the intervention, the teams measure energy 
consumption either by a one-off use of instrumentation, or by long-term data recording. A 
conservative approach to energy saving is taken by the M&V teams, who only report energy 
savings that can be verified. Reports on the verified savings are submitted to the National 
Electricity Regulator (not shown in Figure 12) as well as the client. 
 
                                                 
28 The example was previously presented in Winkler et al. (2007); the implications for climate architecture are 
further explored in this section.  
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Figure 12: Institutions involved in measuring and verifying energy efficiency savings in South 
Africa. Source: (Grobler & den Heijer 2004) 
The confidence in SD-PAMs as an instrument can be increased if there is confidence that the 
targets set are achieved in practice. Taking the case-study of energy efficiency, how would the 
international community know that the reported savings have really occurred? Much of this 
depends on the institutional capacity in the country. In South Africa, the institutional 
infrastructure already exists to measure and verify the implementation of energy efficiency 
interventions in industry.  
 
The international community might want to supplement this system, but does not need to start 
from scratch. If South Africa agreed to report an energy-efficiency pledge, the mechanisms to 
establish that this is “measurable, reportable and verifiable” would best be built on existing 
measurement and verification (M&V) systems. Supported by a range of stakeholders, the 
institutional capacity established around M&V provides assurance that policy intention is 
translated into effective action.  
 
4.6 SD-PAMS AND ‘SECTORAL APPROACHES’ 
 
To compare SD-PAMs to sectoral approaches, clarity is needed on the particular kind of sectoral 
approach being considered. A range of sectoral approaches are being talked about as a 
possible means of ‘scaling up’ action on mitigation, including sectoral CDM; benchmarks across 
trans-national sectors; technology transfer in specific sectors; the sector-based Triptych 
approach, and sectoral crediting mechanisms  (Bradley et al. 2007; Den Elzen, Höhne & 
Moltmann 2008; Ellis & Baron 2005; Höhne et al. 2006; Samaniego & Figueres 2002; Schmidt et 
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The focus of this paper is on SNLTs described as a particular policy ‘tool’29 applicable to 
developing countries only. This policy tool is considered as just one of the possible means for 
developing countries to take further action. Sectoral considerations might also inform the ways in 
which Annex I countries achieve national targets, but in those instances they would be policies 
and measures to reach an economy-wide emission reduction target.  
 
SNLTs were elaborated more fully in section 1.2 and 2.3 above. There are several similarities 
between this particular variant of sectoral thinking, SNLTs, and SD-PAMs, as well as some 
differences.30  
 
On the similarities side, both are voluntary and country-based in their nature and involve bottom-
up pledges. Both SNLTs and SD-PAMs seek to recognise action already being taken by 
developing countries and to incentivise further action, beyond unilateral domestically supported 
actions. And as noted in section 2.4, it is expected that SNLTs will be selected by countries in 
sectors for which they seek scaled up investment according to their own sustainable 
development priorities, and where current carbon market policy tools, such as the various forms 
of CDM, are not considered adequate or appropriate to the task. 
 
One could think of this as a continuum, with single projects at one end, and economy-wide 
measures at the other, as shown in Figure 13.31 
 
Figure 13: Continuum of possibilities for incentivising action by developing countries 
 
 
Some of the differences outlined here may be simply due to the architectural focus of this 
description. In reality, the approaches may be complementary and implemented in parallel. The 
differences revolve around the difference between targets (for GHGs) and PAMs to get there. 
But ultimately, even sectoral targets will require policies and measures to be implemented in the 
sector. And conversely, even cross-sectoral SD-PAMs will need to set goals and objectives, 
which have to be achieved in each sector covered. 
 
SD-PAMs are in principle applicable across entire economies, in virtually any sector or across 
sectors. In practice, countries will choose SD-PAMs that support national priorities, within or 
                                                 
29 The use of the term policy ‘tool’ (or instrument) to describe the SNLTs concept is to try and clarify that it is just 
one policy tool of many in the toolkit to help achieve scaling up. The general term ‘approach’ has led to confusion in 
the literature (approach to what?) and sounds more strategic and encompassing than is intended. So this is 
deliberately avoided in this paper’s discussion of the SNLTs concept. 
30 The comparison made here draw on insights provided by Shaun Vorster.  
31 Figure 13 is comparable to Figure 4 in section 2.4, but the latter is focused only on ‘compliance carbon’ policy 
tools, while Figure 13 considers a broader range of tools, not necessarily aimed at compliance.  
Projects      Programmes     Sector-specific policies     Cross-sectoral policies    Economy-wide actions 
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across sectors. Some SD-PAMs might be implemented within a specific sector, for example 
residential solar water heating would be implemented in a fairly well-defined sector, housing, 
and renewable generation may apply in electricity supply. Other SD-PAMs, for example 
efficiency measures such as mandatory efficiency standards or air quality standards, would cut 
across sectors.  
 
As noted, in practice, SNLTs are not seen as viable for all sectors, nor for a given sector in all 
developing countries. The space potentially occupied by therefore would be narrower than SD-
PAMs, but where it is applicable it can be expected to overlap with SD-PAMs.  
 
But this overlap between SD-PAMs and SNLTs can be seen as complementary, rather than 
conflicting. Referring back to Figure 7 in section 2.4, in that framing, SD-PAMs could be thought 
of as being a (or the) primary contributor to the wedge between the sector reference line and the 
sector crediting baseline – i.e. the wedge showing as being funded by new external support but 
not the international carbon market. SD-PAMs that pay for themselves, such as energy 
efficiency, could be developing countries’ contribution to the atmosphere. The wedge beyond the 
crediting baseline is where the carbon market becomes the key source of funding.  
 
It is not the order of wedges that is fundamentally important, but that implemented together and 
supported respectively by public (SD-PAMs) and private (carbon finance) money, the overall 
emission reductions can be greater. However, both need to be discussed together in the 
multilateral negotiation process where developing countries are seeking the agreement of others 
to their proposals for SD-PAMs and SNLTs. Indeed, the understanding of how forthcoming the 
international community will be in terms of the external (public) support for the proposed SD-
PAMs initiatives in a given sector is key to the setting of any SNLT (crediting baseline) in that 
same sector. 
 
Both SNLTs and SD-PAMs are compatible with the Bali Action Plan (UNFCCC 2007a). 
Sustainable development is part of core balance between sub-paragraphs 1b(i) and 1b(ii), in that 
mitigation actions by developing countries are qualified as being “in the context of sustainable 
development”. While SD-PAMs have to date primarily been investigated in relation to mitigation, 
the plan includes consideration of “means to incentivize the implementation of adaptation 
actions on the basis of sustainable development policies” (1e(iv), the closest the Bali Action Plan 
comes to saying SD-PAMs). The approach has great potential to contribute to the critical 
balance between mitigation and adaptation.  
 
Paragraph 1b(iv) is the place where sectoral approaches are included, specifically “cooperative 
sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, in order to enhance implementation of Article 4, 
paragraph 1(c), of the Convention”. Sectoral approaches are mentioned after REDD and before 
“various approaches, including opportunities for using markets” and so is clearly included as one 
of the approaches available to Parties. In the Bali Action Plan, all these fall under the rubric of 
“enhanced national/international action on mitigation of climate change”, that is, not only action 
by developing countries, as with the SNLTs variant considered in this paper.  
 
Beyond these high level similarities and differences, some further points of detail comparing and 
contrasting SD-PAMs and SNLTs are: 
 
Flexibility v focus 
While SD-PAMs are applicable to all sectors and activities at all scales, SNLTs can be expected 
to focus on specific sectors, or sub-sectors, e.g. electricity generation as distinct from all energy. 
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Both SNLTs and SD-PAMs support learning-by-doing, albeit for SNLTs with a greater sense of 
urgency added by the opportunity of substantial crediting. Despite the narrower scope in 
focusing on specific sectors for SNLTs, the point is that key sectors can cover substantial parts 
of a country’s emissions. Energy supply and use in South Africa, for example, accounts for four-
fifths of emissions. 
 
Environmental effectiveness 
The environmental effectiveness of SNLTs is incentivised by the ability to sell into the carbon 
market, but similar to SD-PAMs then depends on the implementation of domestic measures to 
reduce emissions below the crediting baseline. Both SNLTs and SD-PAMs are compatible with a 
“multi-stage” approach (to future global climate change mitigation). They could be seen as 
transitional ‘mechanisms’, which are defined around voluntary contributions, which could be 
converted to verifiable actions, which in time could become mandatory if linked to appropriate 
incentive structures.  
 
Costs and Financial Flows 
While the large emission reduction potential of sectoral approaches using best available 
technology have been analysed (Höhne et al. 2006), there is little information on costs. Given 
that sectoral mechanisms like SNLTs have not been implemented to date, there are no 
estimates of the potential financial flows. As with SD-PAMs, costing of particular interventions 
can, however, at least be modelled. 
 
MR&V 
Both STDC and SD-PAMs are approaches in which avoided or reduced emissions are clearly 
measurable and reportable, using a common metric of tons of carbon dioxide. SNLTs with its 
crediting baseline would integrally include verification of performance beyond the baseline. SD-
PAMs, not being funded by the market, would not have verification through such market required 
MR&V procedures. An independent review mechanism would be needed (perhaps after some 
years of learning-by-doing) to quantify the contribution to the atmosphere of a basket of SD-
PAMs (Winkler et al. in press 2008). 
 
4.7 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
SD-PAMs and SNLTs have much in common, but are nevertheless distinct proposals. SD-PAMs 
comprises policies and measures that are firmly within the national sustainable development 
priorities of developing countries, which through inclusion in the multi-lateral climate framework 
seeks to recognize, promote and support means of meeting these policy priorities in a lower-
carbon development path. SNLTs are focused on domestic measures in a sector that reduce 
emissions, with no penalty for not meeting a baseline, but the incentive of crediting for 
exceeding the benchmark.   
 
Some of the differences relate to national circumstances. SD-PAMs by design start from national 
development objectives, whereas SNLTs would tend to involve some pre-definition of key 
sectors. But perhaps the key difference lies in the funding source, with SNLTs clearly linking into 
carbon markets through crediting baselines. SD-PAMs (in the variety considered here) draws 
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Both SD-PAMs and SNLTs are specific policy tools within an overall program approach to low 
carbon investment in developing countries. In both, the implementation of measures, be they at 
national or sectoral level, are likely to be critical to their effectiveness. Both approaches involve 
complexity, with data-intensity, definitional issues and institutional management some of the key 
issues for SNLTs, and definitions of sustainable development and funding arrangements critical 
for SD-PAMs. Locating more specific climate actions – be they projects, programs or individual 
policies – within an overarching context of national policy objectives appears to be the best 
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Key Messages Of This Section 
• While domestic activities, or domestic policies and measures that may be employed by 
countries to incentivise these activities, are mostly unrelated to targets that countries may 
have under an international policy framework, any mechanisms associated with the 
international framework can have a profound influence (e.g. the EU ETS can be seen as 
stemming from international emissions trading provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. 
• A key issue for developing countries with SNLTs is how can the interest of project 
developers and carbon financiers whose activities thus far under the CDM have focused at 
the project level – including, importantly, the issuance of carbon credits – be maintained 
when crediting occurs at a sector level and, in the first instance, is directed to governments. 
• To achieve sectoral emission reductions, national governments could implement domestic 
policies and measures with direct links for entities to the international carbon market, e.g. 
schemes that allocate credits to emission reduction actions by entities in the relevant sector; 
or establishing internal emissions trading schemes like the EU ETS; 
• Governments could also implement new and additional domestic policies, or enhance 
enforcement of existing measures, that do not rely on carbon finance and emissions trading. 
Carbon taxes, enhanced law enforcement, intensity or efficiency standards, and subsidies 
(either adding or removing subsidies as the case may be for a particular sector) are 
examples of these types of policies and measures. Governments can then sell the received 
credits directly on international carbon markets. 
• To overcome the potential problem of the disengagement of currently active carbon market 
players (project developers and carbon financiers) because of concerns about having to 
negotiate with national governments to get credits, a nesting approach could be employed 
whereby an international institutional process (akin to the current CDM) existed and credited 
individual on-the-ground activities. The total of any credits issued under this process would 
then be deducted from the amount the country was later issued for the overall sector 
performance. 
• If a concern arises that there may be a demand-supply imbalance that would harm the 
carbon market (i.e. too little demand and too much supply from sectoral crediting in 
developing countries), a variant of the nested approach may be to have funds provided to 
governments for beating their sector targets, not carbon credits. 
• Significant institutional issues of a capacity, legal framework and ‘public compared with 
private’ nature can arise with all domestic implementation models. (These are assessed in 
some detail.) 
• Given these institutional issues, there are significant capacity building challenges that need 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Like fixed and binding targets for industrialised countries, SNLTs for developing countries can be 
seen as primarily just an element of the international policy framework. In practice, as policy 
tools, such forms of targets have little to do with domestic activities or the domestic policies and 
measures that may be employed by countries to incentivise these activities.  
 
This section considers in greater detail the question of what type of domestic policies and 
measures can most effectively connect with the incentive of international carbon market 
financing applied at a sector level. A key issue is how can the interest of project developers and 
carbon financiers whose activities thus far under the CDM have focused at the project level – 
including, importantly, the issuance of carbon credits – be maintained when crediting occurs at a 
sector level and, in the first instance, is directed to governments.  
 
This section also explores key compliance and legal issues at an international and in-country 
level surrounding the implementation of SNLTs. 
 
In thinking about the nature of the domestic policies and measures that national governments 
may undertake in sectors for which they have taken on a sector no-lose target, this paper 
assumes the following about the general design of the policy option itself: 
• sector baselines (targets) negotiated at the same time as industrialised country targets;  
• periodic sector wide monitoring and accounting of emission reductions against this 
baseline; 
• periodic awarding of emission reduction credits (or other incentives) to national 
governments if actual sector emissions are below the negotiated baseline; 
• the system may possibly incorporate a separate crediting mechanism for programs and 
project activities promoted by sub-national actors within the covered sector. 
 
5.2 POLICY MEASURES UNDER SECTOR NO-LOSE TARGETS 
 
Overview 
To achieve sectoral emission reductions, national governments are likely to implement a set of 
domestic policies and measures. Governments may decide to design schemes that allocate 
credits to entities operating in the relevant sector – similar to, e.g. the New Zealand Projects to 
Reduce Emissions (PRE) scheme, or JI or through the establishment of internal emissions 
trading like the EU ETS. (See section 5.3) 
 
Provided that there is an international market for credits, governments could also decide to raise 
funds to commercialize the received credits directly on international carbon markets and 
implement domestic policies that do not rely on carbon finance and emissions trading. Carbon 
taxes, enhanced law enforcement, intensity or efficiency standards, and subsidies (either adding 
or removing subsidies as the case may be for a particular sector) are examples of these types of 
policies and measures. If such policies are already in place they may be considered part of the 
host country’s baseline, such that implementation should not generate any additional 
environmental benefits. New and additional policy measures, or enhanced enforcement of 
existing measures, would however generate additional emission reductions, i.e. serve to help 
the country beat its sector baseline.  
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Institutional Capacity Requirements  
Institutional capacity within national governments is needed to develop, implement, and enforce 
the chosen policies and monitor the sector’s emissions. Initial institutional capacity is also 
needed to quantify the costs and quantity of the emission reductions that can be achieved by a 
certain policy intervention. Governments will have to ensure that sufficient enforcement capacity 
is built within government agencies; knowledge and expertise is being made available; and that 
robust reporting and data collection systems are in place. 
 
Legal Framework 
The government may finance the implementation of emission reduction policies through the 
state budget, the advance sale of future carbon credits, or other internationally available 
financing sources. Other ways of generating some up-front finance such as the sale of call 
options or the issuance of government bonds could also be explored, though this has not been 
seen to date in the current carbon market. Forward contracts may be coupled with advance 
payments for credits that could be used to help with some of the costs associated with 
developing and implementing these policies. The forward sale or securitization of carbon credits 
would create a government liability that has to be backed by the state budget. Alternatively, the 
government could choose to commercialize carbon credits through spot contracts or an auction 
after the credits are generated. 
 
Governments will have to assess the legal conditions for the sale of carbon credits carefully. 
Carbon credits allocated to governments will form part of the body of state assets (some 
countries consider treating allocated international carbon credits also like natural resources). If 
countries decide to sell those credits, institutional and other legal requirements for the sale of 
such assets need to be met. In almost all cases the sale has to be organized according to the 
country’s procurement laws and be based on a formal law. The sale of carbon credits to finance 
policy interventions can be compared with the sale of AAUs under so-called Green Investment 
Schemes. The establishment of such systems is burdened by a high number of implementation 
challenges, among which legal challenges have constituted substantial barriers. 
 
Implications for the Public Sector and Private Sector 
Where the implementation of policy aimed at reducing emissions includes incentive schemes 
based on carbon taxes, enhanced law enforcement, intensity or efficiency standards, or direct or 
indirect subsidies, private sector entities would not be rewarded carbon credits for any 
achievement of emission reductions. While under the no-lose target approach the government is 
not liable for under performance, it would be liable if it used forward sales of carbon credits as a 
means to mobilize financing. It would be difficult to pass such liability on to private entities. 
 
5.3 PROJECT BASED CREDITING UNDER NATIONAL SECTORAL 
ACCOUNTING AND CREDITING 
 
Overview 
Project (or activity) based crediting under national sectoral accounting and crediting describes a 
possible legal and policy framework for designing a project based carbon finance mechanism 
under an international mechanism that relies on SNLTs. Under this framework national 
governments would develop and implement policies that would allow individual projects within a 
sector to gain carbon credits if they reduce their emissions.  
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Depending on the design of the mechanism, credits could be issued by the government (similar 
to First Track JI) or an international body (similar to the Joint Implementation Supervisory 
Committee Track of JI or the CDM Executive Board). Governments could also establish 
domestic emissions trading or offset schemes which rely on the allocation of credits to polluting 
entities (or to entities that reduce emissions).  
 
There are a number of features common to any project based approach under SNLTs 
irrespective of the specific details of the particular approach taken. These include: 
• National monitoring and accounting of emissions for the particular sector 
• Project level monitoring and accounting of emissions 
• Distribution of credits to individual projects or entities 
• Transfer of ownership of credits to subnational actors 
• Sale of credits by subnational actors 
• Host country liability for credits allocated to project activities or legal entities 
 
Specific variations may occur in a number of areas such as: 
• The scheme may or may not involve the domestic trade of offsets 
• Scheme can rely on the allocating of international credits and can or cannot be linked to 
international carbon markets 
• Allocation of credits or approval of individual projects to receive credits for agreed 
environmental performance 
 
If a scheme relies on the appraisal of individual projects, issues include: 
• How the government selects a project (e.g. whether or not the government runs a bidding 
or tender process or whether it follows a JI-like bottom up approach) 
• How a government approves a project (e.g. additionality, co-benefits, preferred 
geographic locations or technologies etc) 
• The criteria it uses to determine the number of emission reductions the project has 
generated (e.g. pre-set emission factors, project specific baselines, allocation of more or 
less credits per tonne of CO2e reduced or sequestered etc) 
• The criteria used to determine how many credits the project will be allocated (e.g. project 
performance, sector performance, a combination of both etc.) 
 
In addition the host government may decide to keep a portion of the credits for itself to cover the 
costs of operating the scheme and/or for other purposes. The relevant international sectoral 
agreements will further have to establish whether credits are being issued on the international or 
the national level and to what extent the government assumes liability for environmental 
performance. 
 
A project based scheme can be complemented by an internal trading mechanism. Entities that 
invest in polluting activities could be obliged to offset their emissions by procuring offset credits 
from other projects. An internal market similar to the domestic REC markets could be 
established. Countries could also establish a trading scheme which allocates domestic credits to 
polluting installations and require a matching of emissions with credits. These credits would be 
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different from the international credits allocated to the government but would be created by the 
legislation of the respective country (similar to the EU allowances under the EU ETS). Since 
such schemes would not necessarily include a trading of credits on the international level – 
although links to the international markets could be established – it may be treated as a policy 
measure under 5.2 above. The scheme may also be incorporated with other policies and 
measures discussed in 5.2 such as carbon taxes and subsidies. 
 
Institutional Capacity Requirements 
The government would be responsible for designing and implementing the project based policy 
framework, assessing and approving individual projects, and overseeing sector-wide as well as 
project specific monitoring of emissions, and distribution and tracking of issued credits. National 
activities may be complemented by an international fall-back mechanism that resembles the JI 
Second Track framework.  
 
The development of a national crediting mechanism requires substantive institutional capacity as 
well as a robust accounting framework. It has to be noted that until today only a few Annex I 
countries have established First Track JI procedures. New Zealand is a notable exception in 
having pioneered project based crediting outside of the JI framework (see NZ PRE box below).  
 
New Zealand Projects to Reduce Emissions (PRE) Scheme 
The New Zealand PRE scheme held two contestable bid rounds in 2003 and 2004. The 
incentive provided was a contract with the government by which AAUs (or ERUs if requested) 
would be provided based on the performance of the projects over the first Kyoto compliance 
period, 2008-2012. Project proponents were able to forward sell these units to help finance their 
projects. Projects needed to reduce emissions in the New Zealand inventory for which AAUs 
would otherwise need to have been retired against. The additionality design features of PRE 
focused on the desire to secure best outcomes for the government’s net Kyoto position. The 
nature of the ‘contest’ was that bidders could request up to (but not more than) one AAU for 
each tonne of emissions reduced. But they were encouraged to only request what they needed 
to secure the financing value needed for the projects to proceed. The contest was then that bids 
were selected from the lowest ratio of AAUs/tonne reduced upwards, until the number of units 
offered in the bid round was achieved. Initially selected bids were then also tested against 
project financial and risk criteria by an expert panel to test the validity and quality of the bids.  
 
Over the two bid rounds about 10 million units were prospectively ‘allocated’ through contracts. 
At the time of these PRE rounds there was no market in New Zealand for these credits, so 
successful projects mostly looked to European government and entities as likely buyers of the 
AAUs or ERUs. More recently, New Zealand has designed a domestic emissions trading cap 
and trade scheme (NZ ETS) and this has gained favour over the projects-based PRE scheme as 
the preferred domestic policy instrument. Some of the PRE allocated units may now be 
purchased by those with obligations under the NZ ETS. 
 
The EU ETS may also be considered as an instrument rewarding domestic emission reductions 
with the allocation of carbon credits. In its complexity a system like EU ETS however may not, or 
not yet, be an adequate or appropriate instrument to incentivise sectoral emission reductions in 
developing countries. Unlike the baseline and credit approach of SNLTs, the allowances issued 
under the EU ETS are backed by AAUs. Even simpler trading mechanisms such as First Track 
JI transactions promoted by Eastern European host countries have seen a very slow start. To 
circumvent the challenges related to the defining of national validation and verification 
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procedures, it is likely that the majority of JI transactions will rely on the Second Track 2 
international services of the JI Supervisory Committee, its criteria and procedures.  
 
Legal Framework 
The main elements of the legal framework are: 
• Establishing a procurement mechanism 
• Designing a project selection framework 
• Putting in place of an accounting, reporting and monitoring framework; and  
• Establishing a mechanism that allocates credits to the project.  
 
The mechanisms through which governments would allocate carbon credits to private entities 
could take the form of a permit, a license or a bilateral contract. It would establish the right of the 
project proponent to receive credits and may be structured as a specialized type of concession 
agreement, authorization or license to operate the project and receive credits if certain 
conditions are met. If the government relies on a mechanisms that resembles JI and is 
established by international or national law, the contract with the project proponent could be 
reduced to a letter of approval (such as under JI).  
 
A central problem of this scheme is that the government cannot transfer international credits to 
private entities and projects before it has received these credits. This is a fundamental difference 
to JI which is embedded in a cap-and-trade system while sectoral targets are closer to a 
baseline-and-credit system. In order to mobilize upfront finance, a country can securitize the 
stream of future credits and issue “green” bonds in prospect of the future receipt of credits. In 
this system the robustness of the system and value of bonds would depend on the credit rating 
of the country and the trust of bond recipients’ that the country will indeed receive credits of 
compensate for the failure of not being able to back the bonds with credits.  
 
Implications for the Public Sector and Private Sector 
This approach is a means to complement the policy measures discussed under 5.2 above. It 
uses the carbon market as a means to facilitate the financing of emission reducing activities. It 
allows private and public project entities to participate directly in the carbon market. However, 
this type of crediting contains a number of risks that may hinder private sector engagement. 
 
The main risk associated with this approach centres around the project sponsor being able to 
control and foresee the number of credits it will receive. Uncertainty around this can come in two 
forms: 1) uncertainty regarding the number of credits the government may receive and it will be 
able to distribute to projects, 2) uncertainty regarding enforceability of the host country’s 
commitment to eventually transfer credits which may be a greater or lesser risk in some 
developing countries. Some, but not complete, risk mitigation may be provided by an 
international verification mechanism. 
 
The first uncertainty – regarding the number of credits available – is a function of any ex-post 
sectoral crediting under a no-lose target. In First Track JI or Green Investment Schemes a host 
country knows in advance how many AAUs it will have over a commitment period once it has 
calculated and verified its emissions and the allocation of AAUs has taken place. The country 
can establish its AAU sales and purchase strategy based on national emission estimates. If the 
country sells some credits, fails to (re)purchase the units it needs to comply with its 
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commitments, and ends up missing its target, 1.3 times this shortfall is deducted from the 
assigned amount of the following commitment period.32  
 
This is not the case in ex-post crediting where the number of available credits is only known at 
the end of the commitment period. If the country did not meet the target, the “no-lose” 
consequence is simply that credits are not issued. This is the case even if an individual project, 
or even a number of projects, in fact reduced their emissions during the relevant commitment 
period but the sector as a whole did not. The reason why the sector as a whole did not reduce 
its emissions may be due to any number of factors unrelated to the successful project (and 
therefore not due to leakage within a sector), such as a failure of other projects participating in 
the system to reduce their emissions or an overall growth in the sector.  
 
The consequence for this sector-wide failure may land on the shoulders of the government, or it 
may be passed onto the individual projects. The government may shoulder this liability if under 
the agreements with individual projects it is required to compensate projects that actually 
reduced emissions against a project specific baseline. However, the financial resources and 
political will of a developing country government to do this may be limited – particularly if it was 
planning on funding the particular policy (or other government policies or programs) with 
revenue it expected from the sale of carbon credits.  
 
The other alternative – that of passing this failure onto projects may come in the form of simply 
not delivering credits to successful projects, and/or requiring projects that failed to pay some sort 
of damages that it uses to recover its own losses and compensate successful projects. Needless 
to say, there are a number of options to structure this, but all of them require legal relations 
between government and project entities that would need to be robust and enforceable in local 
courts. 
 
This relates to the second risk identified above regarding enforceability of contracts with 
governments. This risk will vary depending on the country in question and goes beyond 
enforceability in the event of non-performance of the sector as a whole to include risk of 
enforceability even if the sector performs and credits are issued. A change in government, 
changes in the value of the credits on the carbon market (either an increase or decrease), 
unexpected re-allocation of funding priorities, or general budget shortfalls may all put pressures 
on governments to re-negotiate or simply not honour an arrangement made years ago under a 
different government.  
 
Some of these risks may be mitigated through establishing legal remedies in the law that 
establishes the crediting mechanism. Other risk mitigation means include political risk 
guarantees or other guarantees from institutions such as the World Bank. Rather than initiating 
these types of guarantees on a project by project basis, the World Bank (or similar financial 
institutions) could play a useful role in offering country wide guarantee facilities that individual 
projects could take advantage of. These institutions could also link this with loan or other 
technical assistance packages to support sector wide emission reductions.   
 
Other risk mitigation options for government risks exist, such as using escrow accounts to hold 
funds or credits prior to distribution as agreed, or regular insurance products. The insurance 
sector is only just starting to offer insurance products related to failure to generate carbon 
                                                 
32  See Article 18, Kyoto Protocol and the CMP decision implementing this article titled “Procedures and 
mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol”, Part XV paragraph 5(a) 
 
- 68 - 
credits, but this type of insurance product could be expected to grow as the carbon market as a 
whole grows. 
 
Finally, the issuance of credits could be approved on the international level (following the JI 
Second Track or JISC model) which increases the likelihood that a government respects the 
agreement embodied in its approval of an emissions reduction project. 
 
5.4 THE “NESTED” APPROACH 
 
Overview 
As discussed above, a sectoral agreement exclusively built on sectoral accounting would require 
the definition of a sectoral reference emission level and a nation-wide monitoring system for that 
sector. Credits would be issued ex-post for emission reductions achieved below the reference 
emission level, which means that, in principle, the cost of the additional efforts required to 
change historic emissions patterns would have to be covered up-front by developing country 
governments (albeit as noted there are some means for forward values to be secured). 
Moreover, under such a scheme countries would require the capacity and willingness to adopt 
and enforce emission reduction policies, as well as to accurately account for their emissions and 
be accountable for subsequent carbon losses.   
 
Consequently, a sectoral mechanism such as SNLTs is based on the assumption that countries 
are able to fund and successfully implement effective policy, legal and institutional reforms 
nationwide, and that they are in the position to formulate and enforce appropriate social and 
economic safeguards – something that may be a challenge for many developing countries. 
Reliance on government performance and a government’s promise to allocate future carbon 
credits (if the model described in section 5.3 is chosen) may also make the participation of 
private funds difficult. The private sector has expressed reluctance to make investments directly 
into developing country governments or into projects where project performance is linked to 
government performance to reduce emissions from any particular sector. 
 
With the aim of integrating investment incentives into a system of sectoral accounting, the 
discussion in this section draws on the underlying rational of the mechanism that has been 
proposed as a “nested approach” in the context of reducing emissions from tropical 
deforestation and forest degradation.33 It looks at whether and how this approach could be 
applied to sectoral targets. A “nested” approach would combine a nation-wide sectoral 
accounting mechanism with a sub-national crediting system as follows: 
 
1.  A sector-wide scheme based on the following principles: 
• A defined emission reduction level, which rewards lowering sectoral emission levels 
• The creation of fungible carbon credits that are issued by an international body that 
reward the reduction of emissions under a reference scenario (or another reward 
system) 
                                                 
33 The “nested approach” was first presented by the Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center 
(CATIE) and The German Emissions Trading Association (BVEK) in a submission to the UNFCCC in February, 
2007 and was later proposed in a joint submission by Paraguay on behalf of Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Peru, 
and supported by Ecuador and Chile. At the 13th session of the Conference of the Parties, held in Bali in December 
2007, Parties recognized the value of this proposal by adopting its main concept as part of the indicative modalities 
for the demonstration (pilot) activities launched by the Conference and by including subnational approaches in the 
REDD programme of work of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). 
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• Countries may allocate these credits to private entities and authorize them to trade 
the issued credits 
• A mechanism of reserve credits, ensuring compliance with the agreed targets 
 
 
2.  A project based mechanism based on the following principles: 
• The authorization by host governments of private or public entities to implement 
emission reduction activities at the project level 
• Credits for these project activities would be issued directly to the public or private 
project entities through an international and independent mechanism, regardless of 
the achievement of national emission targets 
• Mechanisms addressing leakage would have to be defined to ensure long term 
climate benefits 
• The creation of fungible carbon credits on the project level which can be used to 
comply with GHG targets 
 
The advantage pointed to by proponents of the nested approach is that it allows countries to 
gather data and put in place the conditions for assuming sectoral (no lose) targets and for being 
able to ensure an accurate sector-wide accounting without compromising the opportunity to host 
project activities. It allows the gradual transition from project activities that are comparable to the 
CDM to, eventually, binding sectoral targets or caps. While the government is encouraged to 
implement policies and reduce the emissions from the relevant sectors by policy measures, 
private entities would be encouraged to invest in emission reducing activities. Provided that the 
project activities reduce emissions against a project specific (or sector specific) baseline (or 
benchmark) the investor would be awarded for its efforts by the receipt of tradable credits. 
Sector wide baselines could cut some of the high transaction costs associated with project 
specific baselines currently found in the CDM. 
 
The credits would be issued by an international body to the project proponent directly. When 
accounting for sector wide emission reductions, governments would have to deduct the credits 
that have been issued directly to project proponents. The government would receive the 
negotiated credits or other rewards for the remaining portion of emission reduction. In case the 
government measures did not reduce the emissions sufficiently to be able to net-off the credits 
allocated to private entities, the country liability would either be carried over to the next 
accounting period or the shortfall would be compensated by an international insurance 
mechanism that involves the establishment of a certain “buffer” deducted from all project 
activities that successfully reduced their emissions (similar to the existing share of proceeds). 
 
Institutional Capacity Requirements 
Governments would need to show that they are putting in place systems that ensure accurate 
sectoral accounting. They would also be mandated to ensure that the emissions of the sector as 
a whole go down and that the project crediting mechanism would be supported by relevant 
policy measures. They would however not be charged with administrating the project level 
mechanism which would be defined and overseen on the international level, similar to the CDM. 
Governments would however be asked to approve project level activities.  
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Legal Framework 
The nested approach combines elements described under the sections 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. 
It relies on the government taking measures to encourage sectoral emission reductions. In order 
to raise up-front financing governments can negotiate forward sales or issue bonds backed by 
the future stream of credits. Governments would further authorize project level activities. Since 
the credits would be issued independently from the government’s ability to stimulate sector-wide 
emission reductions, the government would not have to enact a legal framework that defines the 
eligibility of projects to receive carbon credits. It would however have to adopt a project approval 
framework similar to the CDM project approval procedures. Any insurance mechanism that 
ensures the environmental integrity of the system as a whole would best be established on the 
international level. A government would however have to put in place an accounting system 
which ensures that emission reductions are not counted twice under the project based and the 
sector-wide accounting.  
 
Participants in the project level mechanism would have to demonstrate that the project activity 
indeed reduces emissions below the relevant reference level (or benchmark). The emission 
reductions achieved by a project activity would have to be verified by an independent entity. 
Based on the verification report, credits would be issued to the project by an international body. 
The rules and procedures of the project mechanism would be set on the international level. 
 
Implications for the Public Sector and Private Sector 
The underlying rational of the nested approach is to devise a framework aimed at achieving 
meaningful reductions in GHG emissions in developing countries that allows for  an immediate 
and broad participation by developing countries whilst facilitating the integration of private 
investments in such efforts. It relies on a national, sectoral track and in which it embeds (or 
“nests”) a project track.  
 
It recognizes that the simulation of private investment into the relevant sectors is an essential 
component of success to achieve overall emission reductions. While governments should 
participate in the efforts to reduce emissions and take a more active role than under the CDM, 
private capital based on the future promise of receiving carbon credits would only be deployed if 
investors are confident that they receive carbon credits provided that the project performance 
results in emission reductions.  
 
The nested approach therefore delinks the rewarding of credits on the project level from the 
rewarding of credits (or other incentives) on the national (sectoral) level. The two tracks are 
brought together when a country has to deduct credits issued to projects from its overall 
reduction achievements. 
 
5.5 OTHER ALTERNATIVES: TAPPING INTO ADDITIONAL FUNDING SOURCES 
 
Based on the success of the CDM, carbon markets are viewed by many as the best way of 
mobilizing private investment for investments that result in emission reductions. However, there 
are a number of challenges associated with integrating SNLTs into the carbon market that could 
damage the integrity, efficiency and efficacy of the international carbon market. The above 
discussion in this section has set out problems associated with implementing sectoral crediting 
that cast doubts on whether it would attract meaningful amounts of private sector finance, in 
some developing countries at least. It also describes with the “nested approach” a way to 
overcome some of the described hurdles. The following section sets out another approach to 
sectoral crediting that may overcome many of these hurdles. 
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One of the main challenges of sectoral mechanisms is to manage the amount of carbon credits 
that enter into the market to ensure that certain price levels are being maintained and to avoid a 
collapse of the market. It may be worth in this context to review the necessity to reward certain 
achievements with carbon credits. While the CDM has brought evidence that the issuance of 
carbon credits is an effective means to stimulate investments, the proof that the same applies for 
governments is still yet to be established. That governments do not necessarily feel comfortable 
with valuing and trading emission rights can be evidenced by the various attempts to establish 
AAU-backed Green Investment Schemes to stimulate investment into climate friendly 
investments in economies of Eastern Europe. Valuating carbon credits, engaging in international 
trade and distributing the proceeds among private entities requires the establishment of a 
number of laws and legal requirements that have, thus far, delayed the trade of greater amounts 
of AAUs. Carbon credits may therefore not be the most adequate instrument to reward a 
government for emission reductions. 
 
Emission reductions generated under SNLTs of developing countries do not need to be 
converted into fungible credits that are sold on the carbon market. The main benefit to 
developing country governments of these credits is the money they earn when they are sold. 
Since the value of the credits on international markets is likely to fluctuate, governments would 
not be able to predict revenues associated with certain emission reductions. As governments are 
not investing into policies and measures to speculate in carbon markets, the volatility of carbon 
credits may be a serious problem for governments.  
 
Rather than being tied to the carbon market, sectoral reductions generated under no-lose 
targets due to domestic policies and measures could be matched by commitments by the 
international community to reward these reductions with cash or other benefits. These no-lose 
commitments can be negotiated and tied to funding commitments that would be drawn upon if 
the reductions are generated and carried over to subsequent commitment periods if they are 
not. The “price” per emission reduction would be established (negotiated) upfront for all relevant 
sectors. The price would be the same for each sector (regardless of the country) but could differ 
between sectors depending on abatement costs and sustainable development benefits.  
 
Industrialized countries could pool their commitments into sector specific funds used to pay 
successful developing country governments directly. Alternatively, no-lose commitments could 
come in the form of converting loans made through the World Bank or other regional 
development banks in the chosen sectors into grants. Other commitments are also possible and 
could be negotiated bilaterally between governments.  
 
If the sectoral emission reductions purchased (or compensated) by industrialized countries are 
not treated as offsets by the “buying” country, this type of approach will have the added 
environmental benefit of generating additional emission reductions.    
 
The funding needed to compensate developing country emission reduction achievements could 
come from various sources. It could be pledged by industrialized countries, similar to the GEF 
replenishment. It is however unlikely that such fund raising exercise would result in amounts 
sufficient to reward successful countries. More money is needed. In addition to voluntary 
contributions by industrialized nations, the mechanism could be fed by institutionalized 
mechanisms through a number of options including, inter alia: 
• a levy on Assigned Amounts first traded in the carbon market, similar to the fees imposed 
on CERs, and/or 
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• fees on carbon-intensive commodities and services in industrialized countries, and/or 
• a levy on international transport emissions; and/or 
• revenues from auctioning of credits in emission trading systems.34 
 
Private sector involvement under this sort of SNLTs could occur at the project level, where 
project level emission reductions are deducted from any sectoral reductions (see nested 
approach above). To avoid problems associated with project level crediting uncertainty under 
sectoral accounting, project level emission reductions still need to be credited even if sector wide 
reductions are not achieved. This sectoral failure would be taken into account when negotiating 
the next round of targets. It could also be mitigated by the international insurance mechanism 
proposed above. 
 
This approach combines traditional public sector funding incentives while at the same time 
shielding the carbon market from potential shocks and providing opportunities for private sector 
investment in developing countries.   
 
 
                                                 
34 The authors of the nested approach propose a separate fund for capacity building and contemplate a similar 
funding mechanisms. 
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6.    KEY INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Key Messages Of This Section 
 
Great need; good prospect (but no silver bullet); cater for diversity; significant challenges; 
solution options exist; time is of the essence. – These phrases can perhaps best sum up the 
breadth and substance of the discussion in this paper. 
Great need 
• Scaling up of the investments in zero and low carbon technologies and practices, including 
and in particular in developing countries, needs to be seen as an orders of magnitude issue 
– and an urgent one. Huge investments (trillions!) in long lived infrastructure are expected to 
be made in developing countries in the next two decades.  
Good prospect (but no silver bullet) 
• By moving beyond the additionality-based constraints of CDM-type policy instruments, 
sector no-lose targets are a good prospective scaling up carbon finance instrument in some 
sectors in some developing countries. While this sounds somewhat equivocal, a key point is 
that these “some sectors and some countries” can account for a very significant portion of 
projected global emissions growth – or put another way, of projected abatement potential. 
• SNLTs are just one tool in the toolkit. A strategic program approach to how to employ the 
whole toolkit can also provide substantial gains, including for policy instruments that exist 
today. Moreover, the toolkit should not just be seen in a climate change context, but in the 
broader context of sustainable development. 
Cater for diversity 
• The process of preparing and negotiating SNLTs and the MRV requirements associated 
with their implementation means that, in the near term anyway, only a subset of developing 
countries are likely to be interested, e.g. the large(r) rapidly industrialising countries and 
middle income countries. But the electricity generation sector may be one that many 
developing countries might feasibly consider. And the process should welcome any 
developing country that wishes to put forward a SNLTs proposal. 
Significant challenges – and time is of the essence 
• There are many challenges. They can generally be divided into two classes: high level (e.g. 
issues around environmental integrity and uncertainty about the correct matching of demand 
and supply) and implementation detail level (both in negotiating this new form of compliance 
carbon mechanism and then having it work in practice). 
• The environmental integrity and demand-supply issues are not issues that occur just on the 
developing country side. Indeed, how industrialised countries are prepared to act in the next 
phase of multilateral climate change action (in particular the ‘deepness’ of their targets) 
goes to the core of these issues. The developing country side is mostly around uncertainty 
with respect to whether the process of agreeing SNLTs (i.e. crediting baselines) and then 
subsequent MR&V of performance can be sufficiently robust. There is also the key issue of 
the potential number of credits that may be generated by SNLTs – and how this compares 
with the likely demand created by the ‘deepness’ of the industrialised countries targets. 
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• The implementation detail is particularly an issue of current capacity – and the capacity 
building needed. A critical issue here is timing. A huge effort is needed in a very short time if 
negotiations of SNLTs for “some key sectors in some key countries” can realistically be 
expected to happen in the time period when industrialised countries’ commitments are 
expected to be agreed and then ratified by national governments.   
Solution options exist 
• If there’s the will, and proactive leadership by world leaders – in industrialised and 
developing countries, and in governments and business. 
 
 
6.1 GREAT NEED 
 
Section 2 provided this context. Scaling up of the investments in zero and low carbon 
technologies and practices, including and in particular in developing countries, needs to be seen 
as an orders of magnitude issue – and an urgent one. Neither public finance sources nor private 
finance through carbon markets can, on their own, provide a necessary response to this need. 
Moreover it is hard to predict how these splits may occur in the future (when urgent action may 
be on the agenda of the world’s leaders, public and private sector) based on their split in the 
past (when it hasn’t been). Certainly, it would not be correct to take a “carbon finance is the 
answer” perspective.  
 
What does seem clear however is that developing countries, indeed all countries, need to take a 
strategic program approach to these issues. This doesn’t mean a ‘cookie cutter’ approach. Each 
country will have its own sustainable development priorities. Climate security, energy security 
and development imperatives need to be advanced simultaneously – and means found to have 
this happen in concurrent and synergistic ways. 
 
6.2 GOOD PROSPECT (BUT NO SILVER BULLET) 
 
The key attraction of SNLTs, one of a number of compliance carbon market-based policy tools, 
is its potential to achieve (more) scale because it doesn’t have the institutionalized constraints of 
other additionality-focused mechanisms. It may well prove to be the best carbon finance 
mechanism in some sectors and in some developing countries. But differences in national 
circumstances may, in practice, rule it out at this time in many developing countries, and even 
where it may work well in a given sector in one or some countries, it may not be applicable in 
that same sector in others. 
 
This reality aside, it need only work well in some sectors in some developing countries for it to 
have a major global influence on investments in low carbon technology. For example, emissions 
(now and projected in coming decades under ‘normal’ business) in the electricity generation 
sector in a relatively small number of major developing country economies accounts for a very 
substantial portion of global emissions and emissions growth. Moreover, even in smaller 
developing countries, many of the priority investments for their sustainable development can be 
expected in the electricity generation sector. The point here is not that this is the only sector 
where the SNLTs mechanism may prove valuable (because it isn’t); it is just that it doesn’t have 
to work in every sector and in every developing country to be valuable. 
 
An associated point, drawn out in particular in the section 4 discussion on SD-PAMs, is that 
carbon financing mechanisms are not the only way to mobilise the needed investment in low 
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carbon futures in developing countries. Moreover, a focus on climate change and carbon is not 
necessarily the appropriate main focus. Instead, substantial investments of a low carbon nature 
can occur under strategic programmes with a priority focus on sustainable development. In this 
case national sources of investment leveraged by international public finance may result in the 
scale needed. 
 
6.3 CATER FOR DIVERSITY 
 
What developing countries are possible candidates for taking on SNLTs?  In principle, the 
SNLTs mechanism is open to all countries. In practice, as signalled by the often used phrase in 
this paper “some key sectors in some key countries”, the process of preparing and negotiating 
SNLTs and the MRV requirements associated with their implementation means that, in the near 
term anyway, only a subset of developing countries are likely to be interested, e.g. the large(r) 
rapidly industrialising countries and middle income countries. For other smaller less developed 
countries, ‘regular’ and programmatic CDM and SD-PAMs are other policy instruments that help 
scale up financial and other support for mitigation activities. 
 
This said, for many developing countries, the electricity generation sector is one where the 
process and MRV requirements associated with SNLTs are likely to be manageable with 
adequate support. Moreover, this sector is often one where major capital investments are 
planned even in smaller less developed countries and mobilising investment through the SNLTs 
mechanism may be the ‘first best’ option. 
 
In summary, the process should welcome any developing country that wishes to put forward a 
SNLTs proposal. 
 
6.4 SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES 
 
There are many issues. Those set out in this paper can generally be divided into two classes: 
high level (e.g. issues around environmental integrity and uncertainty about the correct matching 
of demand and supply) and implementation detail level (both in negotiating this new form of 
compliance carbon mechanism and then having it work in practice). 
 
High level issues 
 
Challenges of Scaling Up: Environmental Integrity 
The ultimate objective of concluding sectoral agreements with developing countries is to reduce 
global GHG emissions. The efficiency of a mechanism to mobilize funding has therefore to be 
measured against its environmental effectiveness. Only if a mechanism results in real emission 
reductions is it worth considering, and only if it relies on a feasible implementation mechanism 
will it trigger activities that result in emission reductions. 
 
Environmental credibility is a function of a robust accounting framework. As discussed above, 
such accounting can be guaranteed through a cap-and-trade approach by accounting for all 
emissions of a sector and creating shortage by allocating less allowance than corresponding to 
the full amount of such sector’s emissions. As discussed in the context of JI, host countries are 
ultimately liable for the achievement of emission reductions in such capped environment. 
 
The current CDM on the other hand is based on project based crediting that is supported by 
rigorous checks and balances to ensure the correct number of credits are issued for eligible 
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projects. These checks and balances include tests to make sure emission reductions are 
additional, and that any emission reductions are correctly monitored and verified. Environmental 
integrity of credits is seen as one of the key requirements of the CDM being able to be used to 
offset a portion of industrialized counties emissions.  
 
It is important that sectoral agreements meet equivalent or higher standards, in particular where 
emission reductions are rewarded by payments or the allocation of carbon credits. If sectoral 
agreements rely on a full accounting and host country liability, environmental integrity depends 
on the accuracy of available data. Where sectoral approaches are based on a baseline-and-
credit system, as in the case of SNLTs, the establishment of the crediting baseline is crucial in 
determining a system’s credibility. 
 
Negotiated baselines create significant environmental risk that baselines will be negotiated so 
that a sector’s actual emissions may in fact be below its negotiated no-lose target. This may 
occur through making overly generous projections of growth and corresponding emissions within 
a sector. Soft no-lose targets have the potential to produce significant numbers of credits without 
environmental integrity that are not associated with any real emission reductions. To be clear, 
this problem is not just true of SNLTs for developing countries. The same problem can occur 
with soft fixed and binding targets for industrialised countries. Managing both these risks will be 
a key challenge of the negotiations. 
 
Baseline based no-lose targets do not reduce the need for the other quality control assurances 
in the CDM associated with strict emission monitoring and third party verification. These are still 
critical to ensure emission reductions are not over estimated by a country. However, expanding 
the rigor required under the CDM to cover an entire sector can be very difficult, and if standards 
are relaxed significantly to make it easier, any corresponding increase in uncertainty will cast 
serious doubts over the environmental integrity of sector based credits and the appropriateness 
of them as offsets for industrialized nations.   
 
Challenges of Scaling Up: Uncertainty over Demand 
As for any market, the carbon market is based on the notion of scarcity. Incentives to innovate, 
seek low cost emission reduction options and to invest in relevant technology is dependent on 
an environment where the circulating number of allowances and credits are below the actual 
level of emissions. The more allowances are allocated and credits issued, the more the price per 
credit drops until it reaches zero in the tipping moment that there are more allowances than 
emissions.  
 
Cap-and-trade systems involve a stable number of allowances that allow governments and 
private sector to optimize their operations taking into account the cost of generating emission 
reductions. Where cap-and-trade systems are linked to offsets generated outside of the system, 
such offsetting opportunities act as price valve by allowing covered entities to access additional 
low cost abatement opportunities.  
 
But industrialised countries that adopt cap-and-trade policies may want to keep carbon prices 
relatively high domestically to stimulate domestic reductions. The linking to credits generated in 
a non-capped environment therefore can entail significant risk, especially where the number of 
credits that eventually may be issued is uncertain. The supply of too many credits that can be 
achieved at costs significantly lower than those within the industrialized countries cap-and-trade 
system (so called “flooding”) may make impossible the achievement of the system’s primary goal 
of reducing emissions within its caped environment. 
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To address this risk, caps can be placed on the number of imported credits to avoid a 
circumstance where a large supply of international credits would push the price of credits down 
significantly, thereby thwarting the objective of the policy to stimulate domestic reductions. For 
example, in order to protect the EU ETS from the flooding of CDM credits, the market regulator 
has capped the number of CERs that is authorized to be brought into the system. 
 
Irrespective of whether or not there is a cap on the use of international offset credits under a 
cap-and-trade system, an oversupply of such credits also hurts sectors included in a relevant 
agreement. The more emission reductions are achieved, the lower the value of a particular 
credit. The system thus creates the perverse incentive to limit emission reductions to a small 




For the reasons summarized above, the issuance of carbon credits for sectoral achievement of 
emission reductions beyond an established baseline can be seen as a risky and potentially 
inadequate and insufficient policy instrument. Any final design of a financing mechanism such as 
SNLTs will have to be built on a careful modelling of the emission reductions that can be 
achieved, credits that should be issued, and market links that have to be established.  
 
The crucial question is whether industrialised country commitments can create sufficient demand 
for carbon credits to (i) ensure domestic reductions in industrialised countries; and (ii) reward 
sectoral achievements in developing countries; while (iii) simultaneously maintaining a 
sufficiently high carbon price. If this is unlikely, or proving to not occur in practice, the issuance 
of carbon credits should be limited.  
 
It is worth investigating in this context whether government performance indeed needs to be 
rewarded with the issuance of carbon credits. Other finance mechanisms discussed in 5.5 above 
may be more adequate to reward and stimulate government action. Since the carbon market is 
unlikely to mobilize the funding needed to stimulate action in all participating countries and 
sectors, other financing mechanism should be looked at to complement the emerging 
mechanisms. 
 
The carbon market has proven to be a successful way to involve private entities into treaty 
compliance. Provided the system is sound, it can stimulate private investment and carbon 
credits are a viable instrument to serve as credit enhancement or motivate equity investments. 
The carbon market should therefore form part of the policy mix that rewards sectoral emission 
reductions achieved by developing countries. As already stated above, government 
contributions should help to create market conditions and the infrastructure for trades and GHG 
accounting. The identified remaining financing gap (e.g. to reward the achievement of emission 
reductions by governments) could be closed by other international financial instrument that need 
to be discussed in further detail.  
 
Implementation detail issues 
 
Section 3 sets out the immediate term issues associated with getting international agreement to 
this new form of carbon finance mechanism, SNLTs for developing countries. The striking point 
that comes out from this discussion is the volume and complex nature of the issues to be dealt 
with – and all within a very short timeframe. Three key issues stand out in the discussions in 
section 3:  
 
- 78 - 
1. A very large capacity building effort is needed, in particular in the countries and sectors that 
seem to offer the greatest opportunity for this mechanism to make a material difference to 
global emission reductions. This capacity building effort needs first to attract the interest of 
key government departments and sector stakeholders, and then engage them in the 
technical preparatory work for them to develop proposals for SNLTs. 
2. It is unlikely that, without some new form of technical assistance, that the UNFCCC 
negotiating process can cope with the complex technical detail that is likely to be contained 
in any such proposals. Moreover, this is not just an issue of SNLTs for developing countries. 
Proposals for targets by industrialised countries may be equally complex, and while 
economy wide may include substantial detail on sector-relevant national circumstances. The 
idea is put forward in section 3 that a new independent technical expert body may need to 
be constituted to assist the negotiating process, and this should occur as early in the 
ongoing negotiations as possible. 
3. It is also unlikely that every developing country that may be interested to propose SNLTs will 
be ready to do so at the time that the international community expects the main details of 
the post-2012 multilateral climate change ‘deal’ to be agreed (e.g. in late 2009). This 
suggests that a “doorway mechanism” needs to be part of the main agreement that leaves 
open the option of such targets to be added to the agreement at a later time. Of the 
theoretical options considered, the idea of having a ‘budget’ for SNLT credits seems the one 
that most warrants further work.  
 
The best option, of course, is to minimise the problem in the first place by having an 
immediately implemented accelerated capacity building and diplomatic effort, such that 
details of potential SNLTs in some key sectors in some key countries can be well advanced 
at the time industrialised countries are agreeing their next targets. These could then be 
finalised in the period between when industrialised countries agree their targets and then 
the overall package of the ‘deal’ is ratified by domestic governments. 
 
The suggestion is made in section 3 that there should be some form of pilot activity to test 
SNLTs. The new World Bank Carbon Partnership Facility is noted in this regard, including that a 
number of the pilot activities proposed by the World Bank for the PCF may lend themselves well 
to a test of SNLTs, e.g. large scale renewable electricity programs. 
 
Section 5 touches on implementation issues following an agreement, i.e. of a domestic policies 
and measures nature. The key challenging issue it takes up is how to reduce risk to acceptable 
levels to stimulate private sector investment and maintain a connection between those on-the-
ground activities seeking the incentive of carbon finance when crediting may occur at a sectoral 
level. A corresponding challenge is whether governments will be seen as reliable partners by the 
private sector carbon finance providers (credit buyers) when crediting occurs at a sector level. 
Both of these are critical challenges; indeed they are potential ‘deal breakers’ to the concept of 
SNLTs.  
 
A key point made in section 5 is that there are few existing successful case examples of how 
industrialised countries have engaged in project scale activities within sectors in their countries 
covered by their economy wide caps. A New Zealand example is one exception, but even this 
policy program has recently been superseded by more of a ‘top down’ domestic cap and trade 
emission trading scheme. It is also unclear how readily the New Zealand model may be applied 
to developing countries. 
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6.5 SOLUTION OPTIONS EXIST...TO SOME KEY CHALLENGES AT LEAST 
 
Some possible solutions to challenges outlined are already contained in the discussion above in 
6.3, e.g. the independent technical expert body to support negotiations and a number of options 
to address the timing problem where SNLTs for developing countries might be agreed following 
the main deal where industrialised countries targets are set. 
 
On the ‘challenge’ matters from section 5 raised immediately above, section 5 provides 
significant discussion under three generally alternative themes: 
i. Domestic policies and measures that governments in developing countries may 
implement to incentivise project-level activities and programs within sectors covered by 
SNLTs – These could pass on the carbon finance incentive, or some other form of 
financial incentive. 
ii. A “nested approach” which provides project level activities occurring within sectors 
covered by national sectoral crediting with direct access to carbon credits for the project 
that are issued by an international body. To avoid double counting, such issued credits 
would be subtracted from subsequent awards of credits to the country’s government for 
beating its sectoral baseline. 
iii. A scheme whereby the reward for countries beating sectoral baselines would not be 
carbon credits but instead some predetermined level of funding. A nested approach can 
be incorporated into this scheme to address both the problems of the need to maintain 
project-level crediting and concerns about oversupply of credits into carbon markets from 
national level sectoral crediting. 
 
Without elaborating further on section 5’s discussion of these ‘solution options’, it is worth noting 
that not all challenges identified can necessarily be expected to occur in all situations for key 
developing countries. The point, rather, is that where such problem situations may arise, there 
are a number of options that might be applicable in given countries to address these problems. 
 
6.6 TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE 
 
The international community has an expectation for negotiations on the post-2012 multilateral 
climate regime to be concluded in 2009 so that there will not be a gap when the Kyoto Protocol’s 
first commitment period concludes in 2012. The detailed analysis of policy issues in this paper 
shows that if the new mechanism of SNLTs for developing countries is going to be part of this 
agreement, and potentially be quite key to help conclude this agreement, there is a substantial 
amount of effort needed on multiple work fronts. For this mechanism to be sufficiently well 
framed and developed so it can play a role in the next climate change regime, this effort needs 
to be initiated by the Parties in the very near term (even if just informally in the first instance). 
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